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Theorizing from Particularity: Perpetrators and
Intersectional Theory on Domestic Violence
Elizabeth L. MacDowell
ABSTRACT
The role of identity-based stereotypes about perpetrators in domestic
violence cases has not received much attention in legal scholarship, which
has instead focused on the identities of victims. However, stereotypes
governing who is a recognizable victim (e.g., that victims are white, middleclass, passive, and dependent women in heterosexual relationships) cannot
by themselves explain why nonconforming victims are sometimes successful
in family court cases and other, more “perfect” victims are not. Drawing on
intersectionality theory, which studies the ways experiences are shaped by
the interaction of multiple identity categories, I argue that understanding this
phenomenon requires a relational analysis that examines the “other side”:
the perpetrator, recognition of whom is governed by intersecting identity
stereotypes that parallel those affecting victims. Part II introduces two
illustrative domestic violence cases and shows the ways in which
conventional approaches to intersectional analysis of victims’ experiences
cannot explain why unconventional victims sometimes win their cases while
others do not. Part III proposes extending intersectionality theory on
domestic violence with insights from legal scholarship on the
intersectionality of heterosexual men of color and performance theory in
order to allow for consideration of how identity is enacted by both victims
and perpetrators in court. This Part also considers issues of relative privilege
and subordination that arise from an analysis that includes perpetrators as
well as victims. Part IV examines the methodological implications of an
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extended intersectional frame, and shows how a more comparative,
intercategorical approach to intersectional method supports an analysis that
is at once more particularized and more expansive in its explanatory power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Domestic violence is a serious social problem that is frequently
unrecognized, minimized, or ignored because of stereotypes about who is at
risk and from whom.1 The stereotype against which victims2 are judged is

1.
In the United States, approximately 1.3 million women and 835,000 men are physically
assaulted by an intimate partner each year. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iv (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/pubs-sum/183781.htm. Intimate partners committed
fourteen percent of all homicides in the United States in 2007, killing an estimated 1640 women and
700 men. SHANNON M. CATALANO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEMALE VICTIMS OF
VIOLENCE 2 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2020. For a
compilation of statistics regarding incidents of domestic violence by race/ethnicity, gender, and
sexuality, and impacts on employment, children, and other issues, see Am. Bar Ass’n. Comm’n on
Domestic & Sexual Violence, Domestic Violence Statistics: Survey of Recent Statistics, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/domestic_violence/resources/statistics.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2013).
There is no uniform or agreed upon terminology for discussing violence between intimates. I use the
terms domestic violence, intimate partner violence, and relationship violence in this Article
interchangeably to refer to violence between intimate partners, unless a more specific meaning is
indicated or appears in quoted text.
2.

I use the term “victim” recognizing that victims have agency and often resist violence, and
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that of the perfect victim: a fictive construct that floats ghost-like between
historical, social, and subjective reality, and is generally identified as
passive, dependent, white, middle-class, heterosexual, and female.3 The
exclusion of victims who are perceived as not conforming to the perfect
victim stereotype from needed services or legal protection—including
victims of color, victims in same-sex relationships or who are transgender,
and victims who fight back—is well-documented.4 However, not all victims
who are unlike the perfect victim are excluded from services or otherwise
unsuccessful when they seek help. I argue that understanding this
phenomenon requires examining not only victims but also what I refer to as
the “perceivable perpetrator,” recognition of whom is also shaped by
stereotypes about race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and gender.5
In reaching these conclusions, I draw on intersectionality—a method for
examining the interaction of identity categories and the theory of what
happens when multiple subordinating categories intersect.6 Intersectionality
theory posits that the interaction of categories creates unique identities and
experiences for individuals who are subject to multiple forms of
subordination, such as women of color.7 Recent scholarship shows that
consideration of the sexualization of race and the role of identity
performance in race and gender stereotyping warrants extending
intersectionality theory to heterosexual men of color, who are typically

that many activists and scholars prefer the term “survivors” in recognition of these attributes. My use
of the term is intended include the breadth of individuals subjected to domestic violence, including
those who do not survive.
3.

See infra Part II.B (detailing the origins and attributes of the perfect victim stereotype).

4.
See, e.g., Ann Cammett, Queer Lockdown: Coming to Terms with the Ongoing
Criminalization of LGBTQ Communities, SCHOLAR & FEMINIST ONLINE, Summer 2009, at 1, 4,
available at http://sfonline.barnard.edu/sexecon/cammett_04.htm (describing how gender
stereotypes result in criminalization of queer victims); Leigh Goodmark, Transgender Abuse 33
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the exclusion of transgender victims from
anti-domestic violence services due to lack of conformity with gender stereotypes); Leigh
Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 96–113 (2008) [hereinafter Goodmark, When She Fights Back] (detailing
impact of stereotypes on African American and lesbian victims); Adele M. Morrison, Changing the
Domestic Violence (Dis)Course: Moving from White Victim to Multi-Cultural Survivor, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1061 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course] (describing a
domestic violence discourse that defines who is and is not viewed as a victim).
5.

See infra Part III.A (discussing stereotypes related to perpetrators).

6.
See infra Part II.B (describing intersectionality theory); infra Part IV (describing
intersectional method).
7.
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex]
(describing how single-axis theories of discrimination fail to capture the multi-dimensional
experiences of black women).
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characterized as singly subordinated.8 This scholarship shows that identities
associated with privilege can be sources of subordination depending on
context and intervening norms and stereotypes.9 Using case studies of two
domestic violence cases with outcomes that are unanticipated and
unexplained by conventional approaches as examples, I argue that the
intersectional frame as applied to domestic violence should be extended to
include an analysis of the performed intersectional identities of both victims
and perpetrators.
Examining the intersectional identity of perpetrators is an intervention
with far-reaching implications. Although the racial, ethnic, and gender
construction of perpetrators has been explored in legal scholarship,10
scholarship on domestic violence does not usually factor the identity of
perpetrators into the analysis of case outcomes.11 Nor do scholars typically
compare the experiences of victims who are unlike the perfect victim
stereotype or consider why their experiences in the legal system differ from
one another; the identities of white victims also remain unexamined with
any specificity.12 By extending the intersectional frame to include
perpetrators, this Article contributes to understandings of how identity
shapes responses to domestic violence in ways that cannot be addressed by
focusing on victims alone. Ultimately, this requires rethinking the ways in
8.
See Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853 (2006) [hereinafter
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity] (laying out the basis for extending intersectionality
theory to heterosexual black men); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Remedying Employment Discrimination
Against African-American Males: Stereotypical Biases Engender a Case of Race Plus Sex
Discrimination, 36 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 26 (1996) (making an earlier iteration of this argument in
the employment discrimination context). See also Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, PostRacialism and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV.
L.J. 1, 3–5 (2010) [hereinafter Cooper, Masculinities] (discussing the importance of analyzing
masculinity in a “multidimensional way that acknowledges that gender and race (as well as class and
other identities) operate simultaneously, inextricably, and in a context-dependent manner”).
9.
See Cooper, Masculinities, supra note 8 (explaining that heterosexual black men who fail
to comply with assimilationist racial norms are being stereotyped as criminal, animalistic, and
hypersexual). See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,”
“Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 285, 312 (2001) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Identity Crisis] (discussing the ways in which
“heterosexual status, typically a privileged category, has served as a source of racial subjugation”
and describing lynching as an example of “racist, sexualized rhetoric that constructed black males as
heterosexual threats to white women”).
10.
See, e.g., Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 876–79 (discussing
the construction of the “Bad Black Man”); Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White:
Racialized Gender Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20–21 (1998)
(describing a “lynch mob ideology” that constructs black men as perpetrators); Abbe Smith, The
“Monster” in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 387–91
(2005) (describing the gendered dimensions of responses to Aileen Wuornos).
11.
See infra Part IV (describing how traditional intersectional method tends to limit
categorical complexity).
12.

See supra note 11.
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which the interrelationships of identity categories are construed in domestic
violence theory and practice, including the identities of white women who
are victims.13 In turn, it requires an extension of intersectional method and
analysis that shifts the locus of the inquiry from the intersection of
subordinating social categories to the interstices—the spaces in between
converging categories of power.14 This shift will permit the analysis of
relative privilege and subordination that adding the perpetrator to
intersectional analysis requires. It will also create a space more conducive to
drawing connections across categories of difference and incorporating the
analysis of power more directly into intersectional analysis.15
While expanding the analysis to include the intersectional identities of
all parties in a domestic violence case may raise normative concerns,
acknowledging the role of the perceivable perpetrator in case outcomes is
not about excusing violence or other abuse.16 Not attending to the
connections between victims and perpetrators allows racist, ethnocentric,
and heterosexist stereotypes underlying both the perfect victim and the
perceivable perpetrator to flourish. In contrast, addressing these connections
holds the potential to advance anti-domestic violence work and further the
purpose of intersectional inquiry, which is to describe and resist
subordination.17 Thus, my proposal offers a nonexclusive strategy for
extending the intersectional frame in order to accommodate a more nuanced
analysis in a field characterized by dynamic and changing understandings
and contexts, which will benefit from multiple interventions and
methodologies.
Part II of this Article presents the cases of Sandra and Jerome and
Madeline and Steve: two couples of color who appear in front of the same
family court judge but whose cases result in apparently inconsistent

13.
See infra Part III (arguing that individual identity should be distinguished from
stereotypes like the perfect victim); infra Part IV (discussing approaches to studying the intersection
of identity categories).
14.
See infra Part IV (discussing shifts in the analytical structure of intersectional theory
about domestic violence required for a more relational analysis that includes perpetrators).
15.

See supra note 14.

16.
See infra Part III (describing why analysis of relative subordination should not be
confused with relativity).
17.
See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701, 707 (2001) [hereinafter The Fifth Black Woman] (describing the aim of intersectionality
as not only making certain identities visible, but centering them in law and politics); Natalie J.
Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender:
Challenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse
Communities, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 39 (2005) (describing the latter as two distinct
objectives of intersectional domestic violence scholarship). See also Rita Kaur Dhamoon,
Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality, 64 POL. RES. Q. 230, 234 (2011) (“This
attention to power, as the subject of struggle and the subject of transformation, gives an
intersectional-type research paradigm its critical edge.”).
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outcomes. This Part shows how the apparent inconsistency in their case
outcomes is unexplained by routine failures of the family court system to
protect victims or by single-axis accounts of race and gender. This Part also
presents intersectionality theory and the history and function of the perfect
victim stereotype in greater detail. Additionally, Part II discusses the impact
of intersecting racial and gender stereotypes on women of color like Sandra
and Madeline. This Part shows that, although intersectionality theory is more
powerful than single-axis theories, a traditional intersectional approach also
fails to account for the difference in their case outcomes.
Part III details the intersectional stereotypes that apply to men of color,
like Jerome and Steve, and render them vulnerable to being perceived as
perpetrators of crime. This Part also introduces the concept of identity
performance to show why—despite the pervasive power of stereotypes—
experiences of subordination are not identical even under similar
circumstances. Using an expanded analytical framework, this Part shows
these case outcomes can only be reconciled when the performed identities of
all parties are considered in relation to one another. Additionally, Part III
discusses the implications of situational and relative privilege that surface in
the analysis, and the need to account for relative privilege within an
expanded intersectional frame that includes perpetrators as well as victims.
Part III shows the importance of distinguishing between situational and
structural privilege, and between the identities of individuals and stereotypes
such as the perfect victim. In particular, it shows that deconstructing the
relational qualities of intersectional identity requires a more complete
analysis of white identity, and argues that white women bringing domestic
violence claims should be analyzed with specificity in relation to the
perpetrator and not conflated with the perfect victim trope.
Finally, Part IV considers the preceding suggestions for expanding the
intersectional framework in terms of methodology. This Part shows that
considering the identity of perpetrators in case outcomes moves
intersectional method from an intracategorical approach (which provides a
detailed account of individuals located along single dimensions of
intersecting social categories—i.e., black women) towards an
intercategorical approach (which provides a detailed and comparative
account of individuals located along multiple dimensions of intersecting
social categories—i.e., black and white women and men). While
intersectional theorists typically juxtapose the primary social group being
studied against another (typically more socially-advantaged) group or
category (like victims who are white, middle-class, heterosexual women),
other groups are seldom examined in detail. This Part shows that the
introduction of even a modest, yet more complete, intercategorical element
like that suggested here—examining both dimensions of the victim–
perpetrator dyad in detail—significantly increases intersectionality’s
explanatory power. However, Part IV also shows how tendencies in the
analytical structure of theory about domestic violence create challenges for
applying intercategorical methods. This Part analyzes the relationship
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between more particular and more general understandings of subordination
in the context of domestic violence and argues that a more particular
approach—one combining intra and intercategorical methods—is
nonetheless possible and supports a stronger understanding of the general
operation of subordinating social structures. Finally, Part IV discusses
implications of a more particularized analysis for practice.
II. THE LIMITS OF AN INTERSECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
THAT FOCUSES SOLELY ON THE VICTIM
A. Two Cases, One Courtroom
Sandra18 is an African American woman in her mid-twenties who on
several occasions fought back when her ex-boyfriend Jerome, also African
American and about the same age, beat her—a fact documented in police
reports when Sandra was arrested as the perpetrator, including during an
incident in which she was charged with resisting arrest. On these occasions,
either a neighbor or Jerome called the police; Sandra never called the police
in response to Jerome’s violence against her, which she estimated occurred
at least once a month over the five years they were together. On one of the
occasions in which Sandra was arrested, the police report states she was
injured and bleeding. However, while Jerome spoke to the police at the
scene, Sandra refused to tell them her side of the story.19 Sandra only sought
legal protection from Jerome after they had broken up and he was arrested
for assaulting and injuring her outside a shopping mall—an incident that
resulted in his conviction for domestic violence.20 Despite the potentially
significant barrier to relief presented by her own arrest record,21 when
Sandra subsequently went to family court, she was successful in obtaining a
civil restraining order against Jerome that protected her and the son she had
with Jerome, as well as orders for sole physical and legal custody, and an
order that Jerome’s visitation would be professionally monitored. At the
time of the family court hearing, Sandra was a clerk in a professional office
and Jerome was unemployed. She testified that he had sold marijuana to earn
a living during their relationship, while she always held a legitimate job.
Madeline is an American-born Mexican American whose case against

18.
The stories in this Article are drawn from the experiences of my clients. Names and other
details have been changed in order to protect their privacy.
19.

Sandra testified that she believed Jerome would retaliate if she talked to the police.

20.
Jerome pled “not guilty” to intentional infliction of corporal injury, an offense that may be
charged as a misdemeanor or felony, and was convicted of simple domestic battery following trial.
21.
Women who use force against an abusive intimate partner lose credibility as victims with
judges, juries, and attorneys. See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 94–95
(describing how “[o]nce a battered woman uses violence, her status as ‘victim’ is imperiled”).
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her mixed race (Latino/white)22 husband Steve appeared some months later
in front of the same family court judge. Madeline and Steve were in their
early twenties and had been together since their teens. Like Sandra,
Madeline supported the family in a semi-professional office job, while Steve
was chronically unemployed throughout their relationship. Evidence was
presented in family court showing that Steve had been fired from jobs for
stealing from his employers, and he was unemployed at the time of the trial.
Also like Sandra, Madeline had never called the police about Steve’s abuse,
which she reported had been ongoing during their seven-year relationship,
and only sought help after an incident of post-separation violence that
occurred in a public place and resulted in Steve’s arrest and conviction for
domestic violence.23 Additionally, there was evidence that Madeline
suffered physical injuries from the most recent episode of domestic violence,
as well as in past incidents of abuse. Police reports also documented that she
did not cooperate with police on one occasion, refusing to answer questions
during a domestic violence call initiated by a neighbor. However, instead of
Madeline’s arrest, this incident resulted in her being transported to the
emergency room and put on a psychiatric hold after Steve claimed that she
had attempted suicide. Unlike Sandra, Madeline had never been arrested or
charged with domestic violence.
But although Sandra and Madeline sought the same orders from the
same judge, the results of their family court cases were different. While the
judge granted Madeline a protective order and an order for custody of the
couple’s two children, he impatiently rejected her requests that Steve’s
visitation of the children be supervised. Instead, he minimized her safety
concerns regarding the children, and granted Steve extended periods of
contact, including overnight visits. In stark contrast to Sandra’s case, the
judge treated Madeline and Steve as mutually blameworthy and ordered both
parties, to attend parenting classes. As Madeline described to me regarding
her family court experience after the trial, “There was no question that I was
beat [by my husband]. The judge knew I was beat and didn’t care. I was less
than zero.”24
This difference in outcomes is not explained by the facts of these cases.
In each case, the perpetrator’s criminal court conviction would constitute a
22.
I use the terms Latina and Latino throughout this Article to refer to individuals of Latin
American, Caribbean, and mixed ethnic origin or ancestry. In addition, because Latinas/os are multiracial and multi-ethnic, I use the term race/ethnicity to discuss issues related to discrimination
against Latinos, and when discussing people of color, including Latinos, rather than trying to
distinguish between discrimination based on racism and ethnocentrism. See Katherine CullitonGonzález, Time to Revive Puerto Rican Voting Rights, 19 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 27, 46–47 n.150
(2008) (discussing the basis for this approach given the intersection of race and ethnicity in
discrimination against Latinos).
23.
Steve pled guilty to the same charge Jerome was convicted of—simple domestic battery—
after the prosecutor reduced the charge in a plea deal.
24.

See supra note 18.
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finding that domestic violence occurred, establishing a basis for issuance of
civil restraining orders25 and a rebuttable presumption in the victim’s favor
for child custody.26 Moreover, many of the commonalities in these cases are
significant indictors of future lethality.27 But that did not make issuance of
the requested orders a sure thing in either case. Studies have shown that
judges are reluctant to deny custody even to adjudicated batterers.28 While
the existence of a statutory presumption that batterers are unfit for custody
makes it more likely that judges will award sole custody to the victim rather
than the perpetrator, research shows that high percentages of adjudicated
batterers are still awarded custody in states with such a presumption.29 That
Sandra obtained an order for supervised visitation is especially remarkable.

25.
All fifty states have statutes authorizing issuance of civil orders of protection for domestic
abuse based on physical violence and other criminal acts. Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm,
Reimagining Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107,
1131–32 (2009). Two-thirds of the states limit protection to those cases. Id. at 1112.
26.
Twenty-five states have statutory presumptions that an adjudicated perpetrator of
domestic violence shall not be awarded custody of minor children. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON
JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT A PERPETRATOR OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SHALL NOT HAVE SOLE CUSTODY, JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY, OR JOINT
PHYSICAL CUSTODY (Jan. 1, 2009) (on file with author) (compiling state statutes). Sandra and
Madeline’s cases were tried in a state with such a presumption.
27.
See Neil Websdale & Bahney Dedolph, Nat’l Res. Ctr. On Domestic Violence, Lethality
Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis, VAWNET.ORG, http://www.vawnet.org/research/printdocument.php?doc_id=387&find_type=web_desc_AR (last visited Apr. 21, 2013) (describing
lethality research). In particular, nearly every study of lethality in domestic violence cases finds an
association between femicide (murder of women by a male partner) and separation or estrangement;
risk of nonlethal physical and sexual abuse of both female victims and children increases after
separation as well. Id. A history of physical violence resulting in injury to the victim is also a sign of
heightened risk of lethality in domestic violence cases. Id. Risk of a lethal attack also increases if the
abuser commits a public act of violence or otherwise puts himself at heightened risk of negative
consequences. Hallie Bongar White & James G. White, Testifying About Lethality Risk Factors,
VAWOR (2005), https://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/lethalitytribal/lethalitytribal.html. When in
combination with other lethality factors, unemployment is an increased risk factor as well. Id.
28.
See, e.g., LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT 113
(2002) (reporting that perpetrators of domestic violence are as likely to prevail in their efforts to
obtain custody of their children as non-perpetrators).
29.
See Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the Father Has
Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1076, 1101 (2005)
(reporting that in states with a statutory presumption against awarding custody to batterers, forty
percent of fathers adjudicated as having committed domestic violence against the mother were still
awarded joint custody). Victims seeking custody in states with competing statutory provisions
regarding custody (e.g., a presumption in favor of joint custody and favoring the parent perceived by
the court as more open to shared parenting), as was the case in Sandra and Madeline’s state, fared
even worse: sole custody was awarded to battering fathers in those states more often than to the
mothers who were their victims. Id. Mothers also received sole physical custody less frequently
when the father was an adjudicated batterer in states with such statutory presumptions (sixty-four
percent of the time) than in states with no statutory presumption (sixty-seven percent of the time); if
there were competing presumptions, mothers generally received “primary” physical custody, which
is tantamount to shared custody (eighty-two percent of the time). Id. at 1093, 1102.
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Judges are reluctant to restrict visitation for batterers,30 and may in fact be
less likely to impose restrictions on visitation when there is evidence of
domestic violence against the custodial parent by the noncustodial parent.31
Poor outcomes for victims have been attributed to the delegalized culture of
family courts, wherein issues such as child custody are viewed as emotional
rather than legal problems;32 the vagueness of applicable custody
standards;33 and a general reluctance on the part of judges to believe battered
women, or to rule against men who batter them, on custody issues.34 But
none of these theories explain why these cases had different outcomes.
Traditional theories of race and gender discrimination that examine
differing outcomes along a single axis of subordination (e.g., race or gender)
fail to explain the difference as well. In Madeline’s case, it might be argued
that the judge—who was a white man—denied her request for supervised
visitation because he perceived Steve, a biracial man, as (more) white and
favored him for that reason.35 But white supremacy/racism alone would not
30. Mary A. Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire: Child Custody Determinations Among
Couples with a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991, 1014–15
(2005) (reporting that less than seventeen percent of fathers in cases surveyed where the court was
aware of substantiated domestic violence were denied any child visitation; supervised visitation “was
no more likely” to be ordered for the abusive parent in cases involving domestic violence than in
other cases); Morrill et al., supra note 29, at 1102 (reporting that although bench officers in states
with a presumption against awarding custody to adjudicated batterers imposed some conditions on
visitation more often than in states without such a presumption, “at best, only 64% of orders in these
states imposed [any] structure or conditions on visitation orders”).
31.
See Nancy E. Johnson et al., Child Custody Mediation in Cases of Domestic Violence:
Empirical Evidence of a Failure to Protect, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1022, 1046–48 (2005)
(reporting evidence that judges received recommendations from mediators for joint child custody
arrangements more often in cases involving allegations of domestic violence than in cases that did
not involve such allegations; supervised child visitation was recommended in a higher percentage of
cases where there were no indicators of domestic violence than in cases where there was
substantiated abuse; the lowest rate of recommendations for supervised visitation occurred in cases
with victim-acknowledged domestic violence that was not reported to the court by the mediator).
32.
See Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Courts Collide: Integrated Domestic Violence Courts
and Court Pluralism, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 95, 107–08, 121 n.110 (2011) [hereinafter
MacDowell, When Courts Collide] (discussing how victims’ access to civil court remedies for
domestic violence is constrained by court culture); see also Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV.
727, 731–33 (1988) (describing mediators and social workers as supplanting legal actors in the
family courts).
33.
See Fineman, supra note 32, at 770 (arguing the best interest of the child standard for
determining parental custody must be replaced with a standard that is more determinate and less
susceptible to moral rather than legal judgments).
34.
See Joan S. Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection:
Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 657, 675 (2003) (describing the belief of judges in domestic violence cases that it is unfair to
consider the perpetrator’s violence against the other parent when addressing child custody issues).
35.
Studies show trial judges are subject to implicit racial bias in ways similar to the general
public. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial
Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reporting the results of an empirical study showing
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explain why he did not also react negatively to a mixed-race relationship and
scrutinize the case more closely for that reason, for example by punishing
Steve more severely than Jerome because he viewed him as a race traitor.36
Similarly, if white supremacy/racism alone explained the different
outcomes, the judge might also have reacted negatively to Sandra because
she was African American, perhaps by ordering her to attend parenting
classes.
More complex theories like intersectionality—which examines the
multidimensional and interactive character of race and gender norms and
stereotypes in domestic violence cases—provide a better framework for
understanding the possible dynamics involved in these cases.37 For example,
considering race and gender highlights the fact that, historically, white men
have not been punished for engaging in intimate relationships with, or
violence against, women of color.38 Therefore, if the judge had viewed Steve
as white, he might have given him a “pass” for abusing his Latina wife.39
However, as typically conceived, intersectional theory about domestic
violence also fails to explain why the judge responded differently to Steve’s
violence against Madeline than to Jerome’s violence against Sandra, because
it focuses on the identity of the victim and not the perpetrator and does not
examine the relationship between the identities of the parties in each case.
B. Intersectionality and the Perfect Victim
Intersectionality is the primary framework used by feminist scholars to
analyze the significance of co-occurring identities to the issue of domestic
violence.40 Kimberlé Crenshaw, who originally applied intersectionality to
the impacts of implicit racial bias on judicial decision-making). Thus, white judges are much more
likely to draw negative inferences from minority racial status—or favor white status—than are
judges of color. Id. at 1210–11 (comparing the responses of white and black judges to cues involving
white and black racial status). However judges who are racial minorities may draw negative
inferences as well. Id. at 1210.
36.
See Peter Kwan, Jeffrey Dahmer and the Cosynthesis of Categories, 48 HASTINGS L.J.
1257, 1261 (1997) (making a similar point about police responses to what they perceived as an
interracial (white/Asian) male couple). See also infra Part III (discussing “putative whiteness” and
racial differentiation among whites by other whites).
37.
I share the view expressed by Frank Rudy Cooper that the various theories of
“multidimensionality” are consistent with, and a natural extension of, intersectionality theory, and do
not distinguish between them. See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 862–
63 n.33.
38.
See Fenton, supra note 10, at 20 (noting that white male prerogative includes access to
women of color as well as white women).
39.
See infra Part III (distinguishing Jerome’s experience from Steve’s in the event that Steve
was perceived as white).
40.
See, e.g., Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1065 n.6 (providing
examples of scholars using an intersectional analysis to study the problem of domestic violence). On
the institutionalization of intersectionality as a mode of analysis in the academy more generally, see
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analyze experiences of black women in employment discrimination cases,
introduced the term into legal scholarship.41 Using the analogy of traffic at a
four-way intersection, Crenshaw argued that the existence of more than one
subordinate identity creates distinct vulnerabilities to further
disempowerment that cannot be accurately captured or addressed by
analyzing a single axis of subordination alone: “If an accident happens in an
intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling from any number of
directions and, sometimes, from all of them.”42 Thus, she reasoned, while a
black woman may be harmed by practices that are sexist or racist, she may
also be uniquely harmed by practices that harm neither men of color nor
white women.43 Crenshaw subsequently extended intersectional analysis to
other women of color and to the intersection of gender and other categories
of identity.44 She defined structural intersectionality as “the ways in which
the location of women of color at the intersection of race and gender makes
[their] actual experience . . . qualitatively different than that of white
women.”45
Using intersectionality, feminist scholar–activists have shown the ways
in which women of color victimized by intimate partner violence are
disadvantaged by what Adele Morrison characterizes as a racialized
domestic violence legal discourse.46 Morrison describes three interrelated
parts to the domestic violence discourse: the battered woman identity (that
battered women must adopt in order to access services and remedies for
Jennifer C. Nash, ‘Home Truths’ on Intersectionality, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 445, 446–47
(2011). See also Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS 1771, 1771 (2005)
(characterizing intersectionality as “the most important theoretical contribution that women’s
studies, in conjunction with related fields, has made so far”).
41.

See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 7.

42.

Id. at 149.

43.
See id. (explaining, as a result, “Black women sometimes experience discrimination in
ways similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with
Black men. Yet often they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practices
which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes, they experience
discrimination as Black women—not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black
women.”).
44.
See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1246–50 (1991) [hereinafter
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins] (examining intersections of race, gender, and immigration status
in relation to domestic violence laws, services and policies). Crenshaw also encouraged extension of
intersectionality to additional identity categories, including class and sexual orientation. Id. at 1244–
45 n.9. For a history of the concept of intersectionality in black feminist thought, see Nash, supra
note 40. See also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 17–18 (2000) (discussing the development,
after 1980, of works by black women scholar–activists exploring the interconnectedness of
oppressions).
45.

Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1245.

46.

Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1068.
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abuse);47 the empowerment continuum (the process by which a battered
woman ends the abuse, including through taking on the battered woman
identity and engaging the legal system);48 and legal practice (consisting of
legal structures, substantive law, and procedural processes, each of which
require successful performance of the battered woman identity).49 The
problem for women of color, as Morrison explains, is that the battered
woman identity that threads through each element of domestic violence
discourse is typically perceived as white.50 More specifically, she is the
perfect victim described previously—a white, middle-class, heterosexual
woman who is passive and dependent.51 She does not fight back.52 Other
than the need for protection, she lacks special needs of any kind.53
The origins of the perfect victim in domestic violence legal discourse
lie in the confluence of three factors: social science theories about domestic
violence that attribute passivity and helplessness to victims;54 political
decisions by the feminist and battered women’s movements to emphasize
the universality of battered women’s experiences based on gender rather
than other structural factors contributing to women’s vulnerability to
violence, like race and class;55 and deeply-entrenched gender norms that are

47.
Id. at 1078–86. See also Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 81–82
(explaining victims must successfully access a preexisting stock narrative about domestic violence in
order to get help).
48.
Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1086–91 (describing how the
domestic violence discourse became more restrictive as anti-domestic violence services became
more professionalized and bureaucratic).
49.

Id. at 1091–97 (detailing the ways in which legal categories are exclusive in character).

50.

Id. at 1077.

51.

See id. at 1078 (describing these as the qualities of the “essential battered woman”).

52.
See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 83–85 (describing the passivity of
the paradigmatic victim).
53.
See JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSES 133 (1999) (describing the “ideal victim profile” as “a white woman who speaks English
and has no material needs or who has the means to hire an attorney to seek financial support through
the . . . court”).
54.
See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 82–85 (describing the influence of
psychologist Lenore Walker’s theory of learned helplessness on the perception of victims of
domestic violence as passive). See also Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality:
Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520
passim (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Particularity and Generality] (discussing the unintended
consequences of psychological theories like learned helplessness on perceptions of battered women).
55.
See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1258–61 (discussing the use of
universalized gender narratives to raise awareness of domestic violence in the white community that
disregard the significance of race and poverty to violence in the lives of women of color). See also
Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 86 (detailing how “[t]he battered women's
movement has long struggled with issues of race”).
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also associated with white womanhood.56 By failing to challenge the racist
and sexist norms and stereotypes underlying the characterization of victims,
the first two factors allowed the third to thrive.57 Historically persistent
stereotypes of white women are that they are passive, fragile, and peaceful.58
They are also idealized as “the ideal housewife, and the symbol of love and
motherhood.”59 As Zanita Fenton describes, these are also the qualities of
the “good girl” who deserves protection: “[o]nly ‘good girls,’ who are
expected to be chaste and truthful, can be victims.”60
In contrast, women of color are subject to stereotypes that are directly
contrary to the perfect victim based on their race/ethnicity alone. Black
women, for example, are viewed as tough, strong, and psychologically
dominant,61 as well as sly and untrustworthy.62 Latinas can be stereotyped as
hot-blooded and temperamental.63 Although other stereotypes of Latinas are
more consistent with the perfect victim, including portrayals of Latinas as
virginal and innocent,64 Latinas may also be viewed as accepting of
patriarchal family structures and violence in their relationships with men,

56.

See Fenton, supra note 10, at 21 (describing gender and racial norms about womanhood).

57.
See Beth E. Richie, A Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND CULTURE 50,
52–53 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt eds., 2005) (arguing a universalized gender approach to
domestic violence led to the erasure of women of color and low income women from the dominant
view of the problem).
58.
Fenton, supra note 10, at 21 (citing Mae C. King, The Politics of Sexual Stereotypes, 4
BLACK SCHOLAR 12, 15 (1973)).
59.

Id.

60.

Id. at 22.

61.
Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonna, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes:
The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003, 1032–
33 (1995).
62.
Wendy Brown-Scott, Anita Hill Meets Godzilla: Confessions of a Horror Movie Fan, 70
TUL. L. REV. 1921, 1932 (1996) (citing GLASS CEILING COMM’N, DEP’T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR
BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995)). While these attributes
predominate, the repertoire of stereotypes associated with black women is complex. See Ammons,
supra note 61, at 1013 n.44 (detailing stereotypes historically applied to black women). None
however are consistent with the perfect victim. See COLLINS, supra note 44, at 5 (arguing, “[f]rom
the mammies, jezebels, and breeder women of slavery to the smiling Aunt Jemimas on pancake mix
boxes, ubiquitous Black prostitutes, and ever-present welfare mothers of contemporary popular
culture, negative stereotypes applied to African American women have been fundamental to Black
women’s oppression”).
63.
Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1082–83; Jenny Rivera,
Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and
Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 240–41 (1994); Women: Barriers to Living
Violence Free, ACT, http://www.actabuse.com/latinas.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
64.
Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.51 (describing how these stereotypes were memorialized
as cultural archetypes in the characters of innocent, sweet, and virginal Maria, and sexy, loud, and
promiscuous Anita in West Side Story).
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and therefore undeserving of protection.65 In each case, women of color face
the additional hurdle of overcoming negative stereotypes in order to
establish themselves as meeting the criteria of another stereotype: that of the
perfect victim.
As Morrison points out, those excluded from the domestic violence
discourse by virtue of the perfect victim trope include more than
heterosexual women of color.66 In fact, most victims do not meet the perfect
victim criteria. Moreover, as reflected in the family court statistics discussed
above, the domestic violence discourse does not necessarily work well for
anyone, including white women.67 Rather, the qualities associated with the
perfect victim are those qualities associated with white women at the level of
stereotype—assumptions and responses that operate on a subconscious
level.68
Madeline and Sandra’s stories demonstrate many of the ways in which
victims may operate both inside and outside of the perfect victim trope.
Although they are both women abused by male partners in heterosexual
relationships, Sandra and Madeline show that women sometimes fight back
against abusers rather than remaining passive,69 do not necessarily cooperate

65.
Id. at 240–41. Similar stereotypes exist about Asian women. See Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and AntiRacist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 96 (1999) (discussing how the sexualization of Asian American
women is used to legitimize their subordination by private and legal actors).
66.
Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1081–82 (noting that the legal
system does not work well for immigrants, poor, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender victims of
domestic violence).
67.
But see infra Part IV (discussing the problem with the lack of demographic data tracking
race/ethnicity in family court cases).
68.
See Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 364 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed.
1998) (“Fifty years of research reveals how rooted stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination are . .
. [and how they] operate outside conscious awareness.”).
69.
Numerous studies show most women who use physical force against men in heterosexual
relationships are victims of ongoing battering and are acting in self-defense or to otherwise resist or
stop the violence against them. In one such study, sociologist Susan Miller found that thirty percent
of women in court-ordered batterer treatment following arrest on domestic violence charges had
acted in response to a male partner’s violence. SUSAN L. MILLER, VICTIMS AS OFFENDERS: THE
PARADOX OF WOMEN’S VIOLENCE IN RELATIONSHIPS 116–20 (2005). See also Megan H. BairMerritt et al., Why Do Women Use Intimate Partner Violence? A Systematic Review of Women’s
Motivations, 11 TRAUMA VIOLENCE ABUSE 178, 178–89 (2010) (reviewing studies regarding
women’s motivations for the use of physical violence against intimate partners in heterosexual
relationships); Shamita Das Dasgupta, Just Like Men? A Critical View of Violence by Women, in
COORDINATING COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM DULUTH AND
BEYOND 195, 202 (Melanie F. Shepard & Ellen L. Pence eds., 1999) (summarizing the results of
interviews with women who had used violence against male partners); Shamita Das Dasgupta, A
Framework for Understanding Women’s Use of Nonlethal Violence in Intimate Heterosexual
Relationships, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1364, 1364–89 (2002) (summarizing research findings
on women who use nonlethal violence against male partners); L. Kevin Hamberger & Clare E. Guse,
Men’s and Women’s Use of Intimate Partner Violence in Clinical Samples, 8 VIOLENCE AGAINST
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with police,70 and may stay with men on whom they do not appear
economically dependent.71 However, their experiences are not fully
anticipated by an intersectional analysis either. Sandra was successful
although she was neither white, nor dependent, and fought back. In contrast,
Madeline was arguably more consistent with the perfect victim trope in that
she did not use violence to resist Steve’s abuse and thus appeared more
passive, but she was less successful than Sandra despite these qualities.
These experiences show that the perfect victim trope and the need for
victims to adhere to its criteria is only half the story. The judge in family
court did not evaluate Sandra and Madeline’s identities as victims in
isolation. Rather, both appeared in court opposite their former partners,
whom the judge had to see as perpetrators in order for Sandra and Madeline
to get the relief they sought. Therefore, understanding the different outcomes
in these cases requires examining the identities of each of the parties. The
judge may have viewed Jerome and Steve’s racial identities as men of color
much differently than Sandra and Madeline’s racial identities as women.72 In
other words, their intersectionality could be as much a part of the story as
Sandra and Madeline’s. In fact, these stories suggest that the existence of a
perceptible perpetrator may be, at least in some instances, determinative of
whether or not a victim gets relief.
III. EXTENDING THE INTERSECTIONAL FRAME
A. The Perceptible Perpetrator
A victim requires a perpetrator, an identity that is constructed in
WOMEN 1301, 1301–31 (2002) (comparing the experiences of women who had been court-ordered
to attend abuse abatement counseling and women in a domestic violence shelter); Susan L. Miller &
Michelle L. Meloy, Women’s Use of Force: Voices of Women Arrested for Domestic Violence, 12
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 89, 89–115 (2006) (examining data collected from observations at
three female domestic violence offender programs).
70.
In addition to fear of retaliation as expressed by Sandra, women of color may refuse to
cooperate with police investigations and avoid seeking police protection because they distrust the
criminal justice system—a system Sandra obviously did not believe would protect her from Jerome.
See BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK
WOMEN (1996) (discussing the reluctance of African American women to seek help for abuse from
law enforcement); Rivera, supra note 63, at 245–48 (describing the internal conflict Latinas may
face in using police to prevent domestic violence).
71.
Appearances of “financial independence” can also be deceiving, especially given the
present economic climate in which most working people are mired in debt. See Deborah M.
Weissman, Law, Social Movements, and the Political Economy of Domestic Violence, DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2037606 (discussing
the relevance of current economic conditions to domestic violence). See also Jody Raphael,
Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 367, 369 (2003)
(detailing the numerous and complex ways batterers sabotage victims’ economic independence).
72.
See, e.g., Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881 (showing how
intersectional stereotypes about black men and women differ from one another).
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opposition to the perfect victim.73 Stereotypes about black men and Latinos
render them more likely to be perceived as perpetrators of crime, including
domestic violence, than white men.74 Just as the stereotypical attributes of
white women mirror the attributes of the perfect victim (and femininity more
generally), the stereotypical attributes of white men tend to mirror ideals of
masculinity, including qualities such as intelligence, self-reliance,
leadership, breadwinning ability, competitiveness, competence, and
aggression.75 Put another way, “white heterosexual male identity is socially
construed to be normative.”76 Masculinity scholars refer to such ideals as
hegemonic masculinity or “masculinity [that] identifies the most
empowered, those at the top of the male hierarchy.”77 Not only is the
masculinity of white men associated with hegemonic masculinity,
hegemonic masculinity is associated with whiteness and white privilege.78
In contrast, the masculinities attributed to men of color are
pathologized, subordinate, and associated with criminality.79 Black men, for
example, are stereotyped as “animalistic, crime-prone, and sexually
unrestrained.”80 Similarly, Latinos are stereotyped as unintelligent,
untrustworthy, and dangerous.81 In addition, Latinos are subject to
stereotypes relating to actual or perceived nationality and status as
73.
See Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1080 (“The construction
of the ‘battered woman’ identity needs an ‘other,’ which is an abusive man on the micro level, and
patriarchal society on a macro level.”). Cf. Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors:
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing how
perpetrators are constructed in relation to victims in federal anti-trafficking law).
74.
See, e.g., D. Aaron Lacy, The Most Endangered Title VII Plaintiff?: Exponential
Discrimination Against Black Males, 86 NEB. L. REV. 552, 564–65 (2008) (contrasting stereotypes
about white men and black men).
75.

Id. at 565; Fiske, supra note 68, at 357–61.

76.
Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 76, 97, 105
(2000) [hereinafter Carbado, Straight] (describing heterosexual white men as “Mankind. The
baseline. He is our reference. We are all defined with Him in mind. We are the same as or different
from Him.”).
77.
(2010).

NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 27

78.
See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1521 (2010)
(describing the reference point for whiteness as “the most privileged version of whiteness—a white,
non-ethnic, middle-class, heterosexual male”).
79.
See DOWD, supra note 77, at 27 (explaining masculinity is subject to hierarchies among
men, with “subordinate masculinities defined especially by race and class”). See also id. at 61
(describing hegemonic masculinity as dominating among multiple, competing masculinities,
including those that are subordinate and/or subversive).
80.
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 875–76 (citing N. Jeremi
Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2004)).
81.
Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.47 (citing Richie Pérez, From Assimilation to
Annihilation: Puerto Rican Images in U.S. Films, 2 CENTRO BULL. 8, 12 (1990)).
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immigrants that associate them with violence, immorality and criminality.82
Like Latinas, Latinos are thought to be incapable of assimilation to dominant
(white) cultural norms.83 In contrast, black men may be viewed by whites as
able to assimilate into white culture if they choose to downplay their race
and become what Cooper calls the “Good Black Man.”84 However, this
perceived potential for compliance with white norms helps justify the
suppressed social status and criminalization of other black men, who are
labeled “bad.”85 To be “good,” black men must also downplay their
masculinity.86 In sum, for men of color, masculinity itself is problematic,
and attributes that tend to be viewed as positive in white men, such as
aggression, are more likely to be viewed as menacing when embodied in
black and brown male bodies.87
As argued by Cooper, this intersection of male gender with
heterosexuality and subordinate racial status results in a subordinate status
that is different in form and function from the intersectional subordination of
women in the same group.88 Cooper describes the “bipolar” images of
heterosexual black men as compared to stereotypes about black women:
[T]he Bad Black Man image emanates in part from a genderspecific assumption that heterosexual black men are a threat to the
sexual security of white women. There are also assumptions about
sexual deviance of black women, but they are often designed to
make black women seem as though they are available for use by
white men. On the flipside, the Good Black Man image seems to
be motivated in part by a desire to induce heterosexual black men
to desexualize ourselves in order to make whites comfortable. In
contrast, the image of the desexualized black woman is often

82.
Id. at 240. Latinos are also subject to the same negative stereotypes affecting black and
dark-skinned men more generally. See also Ian Haney López, Race and Colorblindness After
Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 61, 63 (2005).
83.
STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE AMERICAN
IMAGINATION 2, 129 (2003).
84.

Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881.

85.
Id. at 888–95 (arguing the Good Black Man/Bad Black Man dichotomy functions to
soothe white anxiety and legitimize racial caste in the post-civil rights era).
86.
See, e.g., id. at 886 (describing “desexualization” as part of the Good Black Man image).
Sexuality, and heterosexuality in particular, is a critical component of masculinity. See DOWD, supra
note 77, at 62 (characterizing not being a woman and not being gay as the most critical components
of the definition of masculinity).
87.
See, e.g., Lacy, supra note 74, at 566 (detailing the ways in which black men are trapped
between being viewed as either not masculine enough (e.g., because they are not viewed as
possessing positive masculine traits such as breadwinner, good father, etc.), or too masculine, and
therefore threatening).
88.
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 879. See also Weatherspoon,
supra note 8, at 34–36 (making a similar argument).
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linked to a criticism of inadequately feminine black women as
emasculating black men and thereby bringing down the black
community.89
In addition, while both men and women of color are subject to negative (and
sometimes overlapping) stereotypes, the results are not identical. In the
context of domestic violence, while the stereotypes about women of color
render them less likely to be viewed as deserving victims regardless of harm,
the association of criminality with men of color renders them more
vulnerable to being perceived as perpetrators, regardless of guilt.90
Guilt was not the issue in Jerome and Steve’s family court cases, of
course. At that stage, there was no doubt that both men had committed
criminal acts of violence against their former partners.91 Moreover, their
criminal convictions were identical and the underlying crimes were very
similar.92 The only question was whether their prior violence indicated a
propensity for future violence.93 In this context, the judge determined that
Jerome was enough of a safety risk to justify an order for ongoing,
professionally-monitored visitation. In contrast, the judge allowed Steve to
see his children without supervision. Thus, Sandra may have been successful
in part because Jerome was a perceivable perpetrator—an individual
recognized by the judge as accountable for his past acts and capable of
future acts of domestic violence—and Madeline may have lost in part
because Steve did not conform to stereotypes about Latino perpetrators and
therefore was not so perceived. However, viewing Jerome and Steve as
intersectional subjects does not, by itself, explain why the judge made this
distinction between them. This discrepancy shows the need for another layer
of inquiry, into how the parties performed their respective intersectional
identities.
B. Identity Performance and Intragroup Distinctions

Intersectionality highlights intragroup distinctions: for example, the
category “African American” consists of women as well as men, gays and
lesbians as well as heterosexuals, and so on.94 Conventional intersectional
89.

Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 860–61.

90.
See Weatherspoon, supra note 8, at 34–36 (citations omitted) (arguing, “[n]egative images
of African-American men as being ‘bogeymen’ and ‘predators’ have become so prevalent that when
African-American males are falsely accused of committing a vicious criminal act, law enforcement
authorities and the public automatically assume they are guilty”).
91.

See supra Part II.

92.

See supra Part II.

93.
See Meier, supra note 34, at 700–03 (discussing the future-oriented nature of judicial
determinations about child custody).
94.

See The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 702 (describing intersectionality as pushing
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analysis does not show, however, how individuals within these intragroup
categories are heterogeneous in their identities, or the way the experience of
identity may be relational, contextual, and change over time.95 For this
added layer of complexity, scholars incorporate theories of identity
performance to add to the insights of intersectionality.96 The premise is
twofold. First, that individuals have agency even within the constraint of
socially constructed status categories like race and gender.97 Second, that
they may be discriminated against not only for their inter- and intra-group
differences (e.g., for their race, or their race plus gender), but also for how
they exercise agency with regard to their performance of their identity.98
Simply put, the point is that not everyone “does” race, gender, or other
aspects of identity in the same way; the results of a performance depend on
the expectations of the audience. As illustrated by Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati in the employment context:
[W]hile it is certainly true that a firm might prefer Asian American
women to Asian American men (an intra-racial distinction), it is
also true that a firm might prefer quiet and passive Asian American
women to Asian American women who do not exhibit those
characteristics (an intra-racial performance distinction).99
Therefore, Carbado and Gulati argue, it is essential to consider performance
as well as identity to understand an individual’s vulnerability to distinctions

for recognition that particular social groups consist of multiple status identities).
95.
See infra Part IV (discussing contrasting intracategorical and intercategorical approaches
to studying intersectionality).
96.
In particular, Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have developed this field in the context of
employment discrimination doctrine. See The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17; Devon W. Carbado
& Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1265 n.11 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado
& Gulati, Working Identity]. Cf. FRANK RUDY COOPER & ANN C. MCGINLEY, MASCULINITIES AND
THE LAW 2 (2012) (applying multidimensionality theory to masculinities theory to arrive at similar
conclusions by showing how “masculinities differ depending on the context and the other identities
with which they overlap”).
97.
See, e.g., The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 701–02 (describing choices a man
might make about presentation of his male status); Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity,
supra note 8, at 882–85 (describing the influence of environment on performance of black male
identity). See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1895, 1916–25 (2007) (describing assimilationist strategies adopted by people of color including
“accommodating,” “distancing”, and “resigned modeling”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J.
769, 772 (2002) (describing how outsiders deemphasize or “cover” their differences to make insiders
feel more comfortable). Identity theory is closely associated with the work of Judith Butler. See, e.g.,
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993); JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND
THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). For a discussion of how the focus of Carbado and Gulati’s
work differs from Butler’s, see Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 96, at 1265 n.11.
98.
See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21–22
(2006) (explaining that possession of the desired social attributes (e.g., whiteness) is less important
in the modern era than acting as though one possesses them (e.g., acting white)).
99.

The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 703.
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based on difference.100
The concept of performance helps operationalize the interaction of
structural subordination and stereotype within intersectional theory.
Performance helps determine, for example, whether Jerome was a “Good
Black Man” or a “Bad Black Man”; whether Madeline was more like a
submissive “Maria” or a hotheaded “Anita.”101 Incorporating the concept of
performance into an analysis of intersectionality also suggests that other,
more expressive facts and dimensions of the parties might affect their
perceived satisfaction of victim or perpetrator status and should be
considered, such as their dress, hairstyle, and mannerisms.102 To the extent
that witnesses may be seen as an extension of the parties, their performance
should be considered as well. 103 In the family law cases, using this wider
lens allows us to consider the possible impact that certain factors may have
on the judge’s decision-making, such as Madeline’s white mother-in-law,
whose involvement with Steve (he lived with her) and her grandchildren was
strategically deployed at trial by Steve’s attorney to seemingly great effect.
As a witness for Steve, Madeline’s mother-in-law’s performance of a
competent mother and grandmother (through her dress and demeanor, and
articulation of care and concern for Steve and her grandchildren) helped
neutralize Steve as a perpetrator of violence by making him appear
dependent and immature, rather than manipulative and dangerous. It also
bolstered his capacity to care for young children (since she would be there
during visitation), while providing a relatable foil for his misconduct
(appealing to the bench officer’s sense of family ties and desire for
grandchildren). The fact that Madeline and her mother-in-law were similarly
positioned with regard to income and occupation (her mother-in-law was a
secretary) may have also helped to eliminate any class disadvantage that
Steve’s unemployment may have otherwise created for him, while reducing
the appearance of Madeline’s vulnerability by emphasizing her relative
financial independence.

100.
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 96, at 1262–63 (deeming this type of
distinction “‘racial conduct’ discrimination” because it “derives, not simply from the fact that an
employee is, for example, phenotypically Asian American (i.e., her racial status) but also from how
she performs her Asian-American identity in the workplace (i.e., her racial conduct)”).
101.

See Rivera, supra note 63, at 240 n.51.

102.
See, e.g., The Fifth Black Woman, supra note 17, at 717–19 (hypothesizing the effect of
Afrocentric hair, dress and politics on the promotion opportunities for a black woman in a workplace
defined by white norms of behavior).
103. Although outside the scope of this Article, one might also consider the role of attorney
identity performance as a mitigating factor in perceived victim or perpetrator status. I am a white
female; a white female represented Jerome as well. A white male represented Steve in both his civil
and criminal case. Gender bias studies conducted in state (and federal) courts show evidence of
pervasive bias on the part of male judges and lawyers toward female attorneys. See Karen
Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on
Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247, 258–67 (1993).
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One might argue that the success of this performance makes a singleaxis racial theory like the one disposed of before more credible: Madeline’s
mother-in-law made Steve, a biracial man, look “more white,” and thus less
like a perpetrator. Her whiteness, it could be argued, helped her to succeed
in this role by enhancing her credibility.104 Taking into account the concept
of performed intersectional identity, however, suggests that, while her race
likely played a part in the outcome the hypothesis that it was, in itself,
determinative of the outcome, is inaccurate. Just as racial minorities’
experiences of racism are not uniform, access by whites to the benefits of
white privilege is not guaranteed; an analysis that takes intersectional
identity and performance into account is still necessary.105
Camille Gear Rich describes two factors that determine whether an
individual can access benefits associated with a racial identity: racial
identification, which is voluntary, and racial ascription, which is
involuntary.106 Racial ascription relates not only to social understandings
about race and the interpretation of phenotypical features, but “cultural,
historical, or contemporary coalition-specific understandings of race” that
are created in particular contexts.107 Whites with what Rich calls “low-status
identity features”—such as those pertaining to gender, class, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, and religion—may be denied access to white privilege by
higher status whites.108 As Rich explains, “although a person may claim a
‘white’ identity, she is merely a putative white person and therefore may not
be socially recognized as white in all contexts.”109

104.
See Fiske, supra note 68 (discussing implicit racial biases affecting assessments of
believability that benefit whites); see generally Damian A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes
Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic Trust Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 7710 (2011) (same). See also Damian A. Stanley et al., Race and Reputation: Perceived Racial
Group Trustworthiness Influences the Neural Correlates of Trust Decisions, 367 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 744 (2013), available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~mrbworks/
articles/2012_PhilTransRoyalSocB.pdf (discussing the neurological aspects of race-based decisions
about trustworthiness). It could also help her more than if she had been Latina, specifically, because
the attributes of Latino/a stereotypes run counter to the notion that a woman can control male family
members. See Rivera, supra note 63, at 241 (“Accustomed to a male-centered community, the Latina
is constructed [in relation to Latinos] as docile and domestic.”). See also Goodmark, When She
Fights Back, supra note 4, at 100 (showing African American women are not perceived as credible
by judges and juries).
105.
See Rich, supra note 78, at 1516 (explaining, “although the basic social privilege of being
recognized as white is typically not questioned, . . . access in a given context to the material and
dignitary benefits associated with whiteness” may be denied).
106.
Id. (coining the term “marginal whiteness” to describe “whites who only enjoy white
privilege in contingent, context-specific ways”).
107.

Id. at 1517.

108.

Id. at 1519–20.

109.
Id. at 1517. But see generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1709 (1993) (proposing white racial privilege as a form of property owned by whites regardless of
other status markers). For recent perspectives and controversies among Whiteness Study and Critical
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In other words, Madeline’s mother-in-law had to perform her racial
identity, and her success in that endeavor depended on the judge’s
interpretation of multiple structural and expressive factors in addition to her
race.110 In turn, even if she helped Steve appear racially white, his was also a
putative whiteness, rendering his access to white heterosexual male privilege
contingent and contextual. In this regard, Steve’s relative youth, physical
attributes (he was short and overweight), and especially his mother’s
involvement in his life, communicated weakness and would be negative
factors in his ability to access the benefits afforded to straight white males in
many contexts.111 But emasculation is also inconsistent with stereotypes
about perpetrators.112 In this light, even evidence about Steve’s history of
stealing from his employers may have made him look more ineffectual as an
employee and provider than criminal and a likely perpetrator of future
crimes.113 Thus, whether Steve was perceived as racially white or not, one
result of Madeline’s mother-in-law’s performance was to distance Steve
from the stereotype of the Latino perpetrator and perpetrators more
generally, by insulating him from the masculinity that would normally be
attributed to an adult male. On the other hand, to the extent he was perceived
as white, he stood to benefit from the relative impunity that white men have
historically enjoyed in perpetrating violence against women of color.114
Additionally, by tipping the scales away from the dependency aspect of the
perfect victim trope, Steve’s mother-in-law also distinguished Madeline
from victim-conforming stereotypes about Latinas and may have allowed
less advantageous stereotypes about hot-blooded Latinas to come forward.
Madeline arguably remained more like the perfect victim than Sandra,
who had fought back—vulnerable in appearance, she was delicate and petite,
and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, which manifested as a type
Race Theory scholars about analyzing differential access to power among whites, see Rich, supra
note 78, at 1510–14 (collecting sources and discussing same).
110.
See Rich, supra note 78, at 1519–20 (explaining, “low-status identity features work [to
exclude some whites from racial privilege] because some whites use these distinctions to judge the
‘belongingness’ or relative status of other white persons”).
111.
As described by Dowd, a key to issues of power and hierarchy among men is “[t]he
rejection of things female, things associated with mothers, [which] is lifelong. To admit weakness, to
admit frailty or fragility, is to be seen as a wimp, a sissy, not a real man. The ultimate fear is to come
up short in front of other men.” DOWD, supra note 77, at 62; see also John M. Kang, The Burdens of
Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 477, 487–88 (2010) (describing the expectation men will
distinguish themselves from women by appearing courageous).
112.
See Morrison, Domestic Violence (Dis)Course, supra note 4, at 1080 (citing DEL MARTIN,
BATTERED WIVES 44 (1976)) (describing the man from whom the white victim must be protected as
a “brute”). See also ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 106 (1987) (describing
historical efforts by feminists to protect women from male “brutishness” in the home).
113.

See supra Part II.

114.
See Fenton, supra note 10, at 20 (discussing the role of racist ideologies in protecting
white men’s sexual access to both white and black women).
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of fugue state and often left her wide-eyed and clearly traumatized as she
recounted harrowing episodes of abuse.115 Her vulnerability was
underscored by Steve’s allegation that she had attempted suicide during their
relationship.116 As a United States-born, English-speaking, semiprofessional, employed woman, she also appeared more assimilated (white)
than anticipated by stereotypes about Latinas.117 Nonetheless, the judge
viewed Steve as less of a future danger than Jerome, although he too was
guilty of serious domestic abuse, and took evidence similar to that which
was provided against Steve more seriously when it was presented against
Jerome.
In discussing these cases with others, people have asked me if Jerome’s
appearance helped explain the difference in the judge’s response;
specifically, if Jerome appeared in family court like a “thug” in his dress or
manner.118 He did not. Nor did he appear like a corporate business executive,
in a suit and a tie.119 He was similar to Sandra in manner and appearance: a
casually but appropriately dressed individual who handled himself in a
confident and straightforward manner; he and Sandra were also physically
fit. However, while Sandra’s persona did not conform to the perfect victim,
Jerome’s did not conform to the image of the neutered Good Black Man.120
In a narrow repertoire of available images, this left him as the Bad Black
Man—the quintessential perceivable perpetrator. With this image
unmitigated by factors like those favoring Steve, the judge determined that
Jerome posed an ongoing threat to Sandra and their child such that

115.
See Meier, supra note 34, at 691 (noting many victims are suffering from post-traumatic
stress disorder while in court, which can distort their affect).
116.

See supra Part II.

117.

See supra Part II.

118.
I interpret this question to ask if Jerome wore clothing and accessories associated with
hip-hop and African American youth culture. Other authors have considered the racial politics of
clothing. See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 49–50 (1994) (“[S]eemingly
inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wearing hip hop fashions constitute a means of racial
affiliation and identification.”); Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 97 (discussing the racial implications
of clothing policies for NBA players).
119.
See PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA 6
(1999) (describing how the book’s subject, Larry Mungin, often dressed in professional business
attire rather than casual clothes when out and about in his neighborhood in order to signal he was a
“good” black man and put his white neighbors at ease); but see Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and
Surburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a ‘Race-Making Situation,’ 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749,
797–98 (2002) (detailing how professionally dressed blacks are still treated with suspicion by
whites).
120.
Unlike Jerome, “[the] Good Black Man is ‘passive, nonassertive, and nonaggressive. He
has made a virtue of identification with the aggressor, and he has adopted an ingratiating and
compliant manner.’” Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 881 (citing BELL
HOOKS, WE REAL COOL: BLACK MEN AND MASCULINITY 42 (2004)).
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supervised visitation was required.121 While we cannot know precisely how
the judge reached his decision, the routine operation of stereotype and the
difference in outcomes in the two cases suggests that no matter how right the
result in Sandra’s case in terms of evidence admitted about Jerome’s
propensity for violence, Sandra received the orders she requested for the
wrong reasons.122 Similarly, it suggests that Madeline was not awarded
supervised visitation and was treated as blameworthy by the judge for
reasons unrelated to the substance of her case.123 Only an analysis of the
performed intersectional identities of all the actors in these cases—including
perpetrators as well as victims—begins to unravel the differences in their
outcomes. These results also suggest the importance of keeping in mind a
structural analysis of relative privilege as well as subordination within the
expanded intersectional approach laid out thus far.
C. Relative Privilege and the Victim–Perpetrator Dichotomy
In extending the intersectional frame to consider the performed
intersectional identities of both victim and perpetrator in relation to one
another and in relation to outcomes, it is important to distinguish status
advantages associated with structural privilege from situational privileges,
and to distinguish individuals from the norms and stereotypes to which they
are subjected.124 For example, because the operation of stereotypes rather
than facts of the abuse help explain the difference in outcomes in Sandra and
Madeline’s cases, the types of stereotypes attaching to Sandra’s identity as
an African American woman could be understood as privileging her relative
to Jerome, whose identity as an African American man is vulnerable to
stereotypes of criminality more in keeping with a perpetrator of domestic

121.
See supra Part II (contrasting the visitation orders received by Sandra to those received by
Madeline). Notably, Jerome would not have benefited from Sandra’s status as a woman of color in
the way that Steve may have benefited if Steve were perceived by the judge as white. See Fenton,
supra note 10, at 20 (distinguishing the historical function of racist ideology for black and white
men; white men control black men’s access to black, as well as white, women). In addition, Jerome’s
criminal history may have been perceived differently than Steve’s if the judge saw Steve as white. A
study by sociologist Devah Pager in the employment context, for example, suggests that employers
take the criminal convictions of white applicants less seriously than those of blacks. See DEVAH
PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 98
(2007) (“Blacks are less than half as likely to receive consideration by employers than equally
qualified whites, and black nonoffenders fare no better than even those whites with prior felony
convictions.”).
122.
See Rachlinski et al., supra note 35 (discussing the operation of implicit bias in judicial
decision-making).
123.

See id.

124.
Melissa McEwan, Feminism 101: Situational and Relative Privilege, SHAKESVILLE (Mar.
30, 2011), http://www.shakesville.com/2011/03/feminism-101-situational-and-relative.html (explaining situational as opposed to relative privilege).
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violence.125 However, this analysis also suggests that Sandra’s success in the
family law case was not based on any immutable characteristic that she
possessed. Instead, she possessed, at most, a situational advantage that arose
despite conduct and intersectional gender and racial stereotypes that might
otherwise have distinguished her from a victim deserving of assistance, and
because of sexual and racial stereotypes applied to Jerome.
In contrast, white women possess, at a minimum, the putative “skin
privilege” of whiteness.126 This means that advantages that white women
experience related to race are not only situational, but also structural.127
More specifically, when white women make claims based on domestic
violence, they do not have to first overcome racial stereotypes that tend to
defeat these claims (as black women do), or appear to fit within racial
stereotypes more conducive to being viewed as victims (as Latinas do).
Instead, they are likely to be viewed as race-neutral in a way that facilitates
their claims.128
This is different, however, from possessing the power of the perfect
victim trope. Rather, those to whom whiteness is ascribed have the
opportunity to benefit.129 Accordingly, although white women may be
materially as well as putatively advantaged by the perfect victim stereotype,
the stereotype is designed to protect hierarchy supporting white male
privilege, not white women as individuals.130 Like other individuals who
bring claims as victims of domestic violence, white women must appear
opposite a perceivable perpetrator in order to get relief. Thus, individual
white women bringing domestic violence claims can and should be analyzed
in relation to other parties and to intersecting identities and stereotypes, and
their identities should not be conflated with the perfect victim.131
125.
This is not to suggest that black women are not subject to stereotypes of criminality, but
rather that those stereotypes are different than the ones applied to black men. See, e.g., COLLINS,
supra note 44, at 5 (discussing stereotypical images of black women).
126.

See Rich, supra note 78, at 1517 (discussing putative whiteness).

127.
See Carbado, Straight, supra note 76, at 78 (pointing out, “[r]acism requires white
privilege”).
128.
See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 871 (“Because the
scaling of bodies creates a normative status within each identity category and ranks others against
that norm, it renders invisible everyday norms that subordinate people with certain identity
statuses.”).
129.
See Rich, supra note 78, at 1517 (distinguishing between the appearance of whiteness and
ascription of racial privilege). See also John O. Calmore, Whiteness as Audition and Blackness as
Performance: Status Protest from the Margin, 18 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 106 (2005)
(distinguishing privilege from identity, and asserting that “dominant whiteness” is not an individual
identity).
130.
See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 871 (contending that
western society is founded on the “scaling of bodies”—a hierarchy of identities with white,
Christian, heterosexual male identity at the apex).
131.

See generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice to Theory, or What Is a White
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These distinctions between types of privilege are not intended to
diminish the importance of situational as well as more stable forms of status
privilege. Consideration of the performance of identity shows that analyzing
situational privilege is central to illuminating the operation of the perfect
victim trope and the victim–perpetrator dichotomy; without it, for example,
the basis for Sandra’s success in family court is obscured. Moreover, these
forms are interrelated and context-specific.132 There is a structural
disadvantage created when categories associated with privilege morph into
subordinating constructs through stereotype: Jerome was disadvantaged in
court as a black man if he was judged based on stereotypes rather than
legally relevant facts.133 Yet, the same racial identity may have operated to
his advantage when he abused Sandra during their relationship because, in
addition to her concern that he might retaliate against her for reporting the
abuse,134 she was undoubtedly aware that he might face discriminatory
treatment by law enforcement if she cooperated with police.135
Moreover, that Sandra battled the perfect victim trope despite her
situational advantage in the family law case was evidenced during Jerome’s
criminal trial. There, in light of strong facts in support of a conviction,136 the
proffered defense was that Sandra was not a deserving victim—whether
because she “deserved what she got” or because she did not deserve redress
for the harm received—and thus was not a victim at all. The fact that Sandra
had fought back on previous occasions was used to bolster this
commonplace defense strategy.137 The police officer who charged Sandra
with resisting arrest testified effectively in support of this theory, seemingly
Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 13, 13 (1991) (advocating for an anti-essentialist
approach to analyzing white women). See also Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, Close Encounters of Three
Kinds: On Teaching Dominance Feminism and Intersectionality, 46 TULSA L. REV. 151 (2010)
(detailing the synergies between the anti-essentialism of MacKinnon’s radical “dominance”
feminism and intersectionality); Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of
Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 257 (2002) (proposing
white women as an example of “hybrid-intersectionality”). But see Sumi Cho, Understanding White
Women’s Ambivalence Towards Affirmative Action: Theorizing Political Accountability in
Coalitions, 71 UMKC L. REV. 399, 405–06 (2002) (arguing that applying intersectionality to white
women risks minimizing their complicity in racism).
132.

See, e.g., Rich, supra note 78 (exploring the context-specific nature of white privilege).

133.
See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8 (establishing the
intersectional subordination of heterosexual black men).
134.

See supra Part II.

135.
See Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4, at 98 (“African American women
may feel particularly pressured to keep their affairs private . . . [because they] may feel that to break
the silence is to bring further shame and disapprobation on African American men from the wider
society.”).
136.
See supra Part II. Eyewitnesses saw Jerome assault Sandra and he was arrested at the
location immediately afterwards.
137.
See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 10, at 32–33 (discussing the use of victim-bashing against
now-iconic domestic violence victim Nicole Brown Simpson in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial).
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in part because of her own feelings about Sandra’s behavior. Unlike the
officers who testified about Jerome’s arrests, she did not have to refer to her
police report even though the incident described in her testimony had
happened more than a year before, and her irritation at the memory was
obvious in her demeanor and inflection. Testimony was also admitted from
witnesses who had, on other occasions, overheard Sandra cursing and
yelling at Jerome. In this way, Sandra, not Jerome, appeared to be on trial,
and her testimony appeared to be offered in her own defense.
The defense’s strategy may have been partly successful—as mentioned
above, the jury found Jerome guilty of a reduced domestic violence
charge.138 Thus, part of the dichotomous relationship between victims and
perpetrators is that each of the component parts is necessary to the other: if
either fails, they both fail. Moreover, both are infused with stereotypes.
Nonetheless, analyzing relative privilege should not be confused with
relativity. To the extent Jerome was convicted (albeit of a lesser charge), and
Sandra was successful in obtaining all the orders she sought in family court,
she did not fail to meet the criteria for victimhood completely. What is
unclear is the tipping point: at what juncture would Sandra have been too
unlike the perfect victim to succeed against Jerome’s perpetrator? Similarly,
in Madeline and Steve’s case, what difference in the identity or performance
of any party or witness would have changed the outcome? To explore these
questions, we need more data and an approach that facilitates studying both
relative and situational privilege without conflating or confusing the two, or
their significance to accountability for subordination.139 A related question
also arises: how to make meaningful connections between forms of
interlocking subordination (e.g., racism, sexism, and heterosexism) while
continuing to develop a sufficiently nuanced analysis of the performed
intersectionality of both victims and perpetrators.

138.
See supra note 20. Evidence about the “worthiness” of victims such as their criminal
history is generally believed to impact jury verdicts, although the exact nature of the impact is
unclear. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (2003) (analyzing studies of jury decision-making in
capital murder cases). For example, while most jurors report that they were not influenced by
evidence of victim characteristics, studies of deliberations in capital murder cases “suggest a fairly
strong correlation between a juror’s perception that the victim had a troubled life . . . and an
inclination to choose a life sentence rather than a death sentence.” Id. at 354.
139.
See Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at 870–71 (“Given that the
singly and multiply subordinated share a common enemy in the scaling of bodies, we can address the
need for an ethic of action that forges broad antisubordination coalitions.”). See also Trina Grillo &
Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons
Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DUKE L.J. 397 (1991) (cautioning against
comparing “-isms,” which tends to minimize the significance of difference and reinforce racial and
other hierarchies).
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IV. REMAPPING INTERSECTIONALITY
A. Categorical Complexity and Intersectional Method
Because the purpose of intersectionality is to render visible those
experiences obscured by examining single categories of subordination alone,
the purpose of intersectional method is to show the interrelationship of
subordinating categories, thereby exposing the operation of power in
everyday life.140 However, traditional intersectional method is limited in its
ability to accomplish this because of the way it minimizes the complexity of
categories. Adding perpetrators and performance in the case studies above
demonstrates the benefits of adding what sociologist Leslie McCall
describes as intercategorical comparisons to conventional intersectional
method.141
As McCall explains, the prototypical approach to studying
intersectionality is to elaborate, through narrative or case study, the
experiences of “a single social group at a neglected point of intersection of
multiple master categories or a particular social setting or ideological
construction, or both.”142 McCall refers to this approach as intracategorical
because it is centered on the intersections existing within a defined social
group—in effect, creating a new category located at the intersection of other
categories and examining the dynamics of that intersection.143 She argues
that this approach typically minimizes complexity in two ways. First, only
one dimension of each intersectional category is studied.144 For example,
considered individually within the category of victims of domestic violence,
Sandra and Madeline exist at the intersection of multiple categories, but each
represent only one dimension of the categories of gender, race/ethnicity,
class, and sexuality. When considered together, they represent an intergroup
comparison on the dimension of race/ethnicity only, as this is the only
significant category in which they differ. Second, within the context of any
particular intersectional analysis, other social groups are typically studied
from the limited vantage point of the primary subject category rather than in
terms of their own intersectional complexity; they enter “as background
140. See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1297 (describing intersectionality
as “unveil[ing] the processes of subordination and the various ways those processes are experienced
by people who are subordinated and people who are privileged by them”).
141.
See McCall, supra note 40, at 1773–74 (describing inter and intracategorical approaches
in terms of “how they understand and use analytical categories to explore the complexity of
intersectionality in social life”).
142.

See id. at 1780.

143.
Id. at 1781 (noting the groups being studied are often “‘new’ groups in the sense of having
been named, defined, or elaborated upon in the process of deconstructing the original dimensions of
the master category”).
144.

Id. at 1781.
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contextual or discursive or ideological factors[.]”145 Thus, in domestic
violence scholarship, the problems faced by low-income, heterosexual
women of color as victims of domestic violence are typically examined by
juxtaposing their experiences with the perfect victim, or with a gesture
toward white, middle-class heterosexual women, rather than comparison to
white, low-income heterosexual women, heterosexual middle-class women
of color, and so on.146 The intersectional experiences of domestic violence
victims in relation to perpetrators are rarely studied at all.147
In contrast to intracategorical methods, the intercategorical approach is
contextual and comparative.148 Inequality between existing social groups is
assumed, without specifying which categories are of consequence at any
given time.149 Therefore, intercategorical method is geared toward
discerning which categories or points of intersection are significant in
particular contexts, and identifying changes in relationships between social
groups over time.150 The premise is that understanding these relationships
requires studying multiple dimensions of any social category subject to
analysis. Thus, the inclusion of gender as a category of analysis requires the
study of both women and men; inclusion of race requires studying multiple
racial/ethnic groups; including both race and gender requires examining the
dimensions of each, and their intersections, and so on.151 Following the same
logic, studying victims requires studying perpetrators along multiple
dimensions of identity as well. In this approach, complexity is managed by
strategies for analyzing data,152 and as a practical matter, by the data

145.

Id. at 1785–86.

146.
See id. at 1781 (noting scholars using the intracategorical method “may aspire to situate
subjects within the full network of relationships that define their social locations, but usually it is
only possible to situate them from the partial perspective of the particular social group under study
(i.e., if an Arab woman is the subject of analysis, then issues of race and nationality are more fully
examined from the perspective of Arab women than from the perspective of Arab men)”).
147.
An exception is an article by Devon Carbado detailing the discursive construction of false
dichotomies of race and gender in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial. Devon W. Carbado, The
Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49 (1997). See also
Fenton, supra note 10 (discussing the discursive construction of race and gender).
148.
McCall, supra note 40, at 1786 (characterizing the approach taken by intercategorical
researchers as focused “on the complexity of relationships among multiple social groups within and
across analytical categories and not on complexities within single social groups, single categories, or
both”).
149.
Id. at 1785 (describing the intercategorical approach as treating identity categories as
provisional, and in some formulations treating the question of “whether there are complex
differences and inequalities between groups . . . as a hypothesis”).
150.

Id.

151.

Id. at 1786.

152.
Id. at 1787 (explaining that data is analyzed in “studies of this kind by what at first
appears to be a reductionist process—reducing the analysis to one or two between-group
relationships at a time—but what in the end is a synthetic and holistic process that brings the various
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available.153
Both of these methods have strengths and drawbacks. The strength of
the intracategorical approach is its depth of field: the centering and detailed
elucidation of previously unknown or unacknowledged experiences of
subordination.154 Scholarship on women’s acts of agency in the context of
domestic violence is an excellent example of the richness of this work. For
example, Goodmark’s work on victims who fight back examines the issue
from the perspective of African American women and lesbians, two groups
of women who she argues are more likely to engage in physical resistance to
abuse due to structural subordination, and thus more likely to be excluded
from domestic violence discourse due to stereotypes about passive
victims.155 This approach is invaluable in identifying the negative impacts of
the perfect victim stereotype on victims whom it further marginalizes.
However, as demonstrated by the case studies of Sandra and Jerome and
Madeline and Steve, studying a single dimension of the primary subject
category under scrutiny (here, domestic violence victims) cannot fully
capture, explain, or correct for the problems associated with the category
(e.g., the perfect victim trope).156 That requires an intercategorical approach,
which is comparative along multiple dimensions of the category under
study, and here includes perpetrators as well as victims.
The strengths of the intercategorical approach are twofold. First, it is
able to capture relative advantage and disadvantage within and between
multiple social groups, and in relation to specific social conditions or
systems.157 For example, in a large-scale intercategorical study of wage
inequality in regional United States economies across dimensions of race,
gender, and class, McCall found that patterns of inequality differed
depending on the type of economy in the region.158 Post-industrial
economies exhibited greater inequality by race and class than by gender,
while regions with recent deindustrialization showed greater gender
inequality.159 In addition, when broken down by class, there was more
gender inequality among college-educated workers in postindustrial
pieces of the analysis together”).
153.
Id. at 1787 n.21 (noting the creation of new racial and ethnic categories in the United
States census has allowed researchers to incorporate “increasing numbers and combinations of
racial, ethnic, and national groups in their analyses”).
154.
See Dhamoon, supra note 17, at 234 (observing the point of this elucidation is not only
the representation of identity or categories of difference, but the exposure of “techniques of power”).
155.

Goodmark, When She Fights Back, supra note 4.

156.
See supra Part II (detailing how conventional intersectional analysis fails to explain the
different outcomes in these cases).
157.

See McCall, supra note 40, at 1788–90 (describing studies that employ this approach).

158.

Id. at 1789–90.

159.

Id.
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economies than in recently deindustrialized economies; in the latter, there
was greater gender inequality among non-college educated workers.160 Thus,
not only were working women shown to be disadvantaged in varying
degrees relative to working men, some women were shown to be
disadvantaged relative to other women in certain economic environments.161
Second, as also illustrated by the example above, the intercategorical
method is able to distinguish between conditions where categories intersect
and where they do not. As intersectionality scholar Jennifer Nash recently
observed, identifying “the conditions that permit race and gender (and other
categories) to intersect would allow us to better understand the mechanisms
by which structures of domination are bolstered and reproduced.”162
Intercategorical research methods can accomplish this task. Moreover,
identifying such mechanisms and their effects allows for strategizing more
accurately targeted solutions. Using the wage inequality research data
discussed previously, for example, McCall proposes that post-industrial
economies might benefit from non-gender-specific strategies for reducing
wage inequality, like living wage campaigns, while deindustrialized regions
would benefit from comparative worth or affirmative action approaches.163
In contrast, intracategorical approaches may result in recommendations that
are only partial solutions. Proposals aimed at making courts more responsive
to domestic violence victims without considering the ways in which
stereotypes about perpetrators affect outcomes, for example, are unlikely to
be completely effective.
On the other hand, complexity grows exponentially as intercategorical
comparisons are added. Applications of intercategorical method may
become unmanageable or incoherent; thus, researchers will inevitably look
for tradeoffs on the level of complexity in order to make the project more
manageable.164 McCall herself notes that it is difficult to undertake
intercategorical research or to publish the results due to the size of the
project.165 Thus, the point is not to suggest that studying intersectionality
requires fully engaging intercategorical methods, but that adding
intercategorical comparisons leads to a more effective analysis of

160.

Id. at 1790.

161.

Id.

162.

Nash, supra note 40, at 469.

163.

See McCall, supra note 40, at 1790.

164.
Id. at 1786. Both methods also involve tradeoffs on the level of complexity that may be
sought along any dimension. For example, greater differentiation along racial lines might require
reducing complexity along class lines. See id. at 1786–87 (“In this respect, intercategorical
researchers face some of the same trade-offs between scale and coherence or difference and
sameness that intracategorical researchers face in determining the appropriate level of detail for their
studies.”).
165.

Id. at 1787–88.
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intersectional subordination.
The case studies of Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve
demonstrate the contribution made by even a modest intercategorical effort.
Examining the intersectional identities of both perpetrators and victims
reveals the paradoxically illusory and powerful nature of the perfect victim
trope, including the way its constituent parts—although culturally fused with
privilege—can be disaggregated and operate independently of one another,
or be suspended, in different contexts. Thus, Sandra, neither dependent nor
passive nor white, was successful opposite her African American exboyfriend, while Madeline was unsuccessful opposite her emasculated exhusband, although appearing more like the perfect victim than Sandra.
However, while the judge may have refused to issue orders for supervised
visitation because Steve did not appear like the stereotypical perpetrator, this
does not mean that the perfect victim stereotype had no effect on the
outcome of Madeline’s family law case. A perceived departure from the
characteristics of the perfect victim could explain why the judge also treated
Madeline as culpable for Steve’s past abuse.166 In this way, the perfect
victim stereotype may function like the Good Black Man/Bad Black Man
binary to justify hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion, wherein the
exclusion of victims that do not conform to the stereotype is justified by the
fact that some victims—like Sandra, who also battled the perfect victim
trope—are more successful. To the extent that Madeline’s exclusion from
the category of deserving victims turned on the fact that she worked and was
not dependent on Steve financially, the disconnect between gender
stereotypes and the economic dimensions of domestic violence is also
revealed.167 Moreover, an intercategorical analysis of the outcomes in
Sandra and Madeline’s cases that includes the perpetrators offers the
opportunity for drawing a broader conclusion from the comparison, namely
that there is no ideal regarding victims operating consistently in the law.
Rather, the judge favored neither woman and instead used a complex lens of
social identity to “see” a perpetrator in one case, and not so much in the
other.
Thus, an intercategorical analysis of the perfect victim leads toward a
better understanding of the interplay of multiple axes of subordination and
privilege, while also bringing into clearer view the workings of single
categories like gender on the one hand and race on the other. It also hints at
the possibility for a much-needed infusion of economic issues into the

166.
See supra Part II (explaining that the judge imposed parenting classes on Madeline and
treated her as culpable for the abuse).
167.
See Angela P. Harris, Theorizing Class, Gender, and the Law: Three Approaches, 72 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 42–44 (2009) (discussing the interconnected nature of class, race, and
gender). See also Weissman, supra note 71 (detailing the failure of domestic violence theories to
adequately address the economic dimensions of abuse).
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analysis of domestic violence.168 In addition, an intercategorical approach to
examining the outcomes for victims demonstrates the importance of
considering the multi-dimensionality of sex, gender, and sexuality.
As detailed by Richard Delgado, racial/ethnic stereotypes like those
underlying the victim–perpetrator dichotomy support taboos that protect race
and gender privilege.169 Most relevant here is the taboo of interracial sex,
which is supported by stereotypes that pathologize the sexualities of men
and women of color.170 Thus, as Delgado and other Critical Race Scholars
have observed, sexuality is a lynchpin in support of heterosexual white male
privilege.171 Yet, scholarship about domestic violence rarely considers
sexuality as relevant to case outcomes outside the context of LGBTQ172
relationship violence; similarly, scholarship about heterosexual relationship
violence tends to treat gender as sex-conforming.173 Examining both sides of
the victim–perpetrator dichotomy highlights the importance of
deconstructing and analyzing gender in terms of sex (e.g., through the
performance of gender identity) and sexuality (e.g., through the
sexualization of race and the racialization of sexuality) in the context of
heterosexual relationship violence as well. Moreover, the benefits of using
an intercategorical approach suggest that studying sexuality in both contexts
and across multiple dimensions while including both victims and
perpetrators would strengthen understanding of the ways in which
heteronormativity, racism, and gender supremacy function both together and
separately.
However, while application of an intercategorical approach shows the
benefit of building an analysis of the more general workings of power
168.
See Weissman, supra note 71 (urging scholars to examine the class and economic issues
related to domestic violence).
169.
See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil
Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1691, 1720 (2007) (describing the taboos applicable to racial/ethnic
groups based on what the dominant society needs to extract from the group at any given time).
170.
Id. at 1720–24 (describing taboos regarding interracial sexual contact that, while varying
by race/ethnicity, all characterize men of color as sexually dangerous or undesirable).
171.
See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 10, at 19 (characterizing stereotypes of race and gender as
“unified around the common axis of sexuality”). See also Delgado, supra note 169, at 1719
(contending that whites impose taboos to control one another: “‘If you want people to avoid
something, you induce a feeling of disgust. You tell them it’s slimy. Or dirty. Or bad for you. Then,
they’ll avoid it. It will be instinctive, something they do without even thinking about it, like recoiling
from a snake.’”).
172.
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning. As used in this Article, LGBTQ is
also intended to include intersex and other non-heteronormative persons who identify by other terms.
173.
Feminists do, of course, analyze domestic violence in heterosexual relationships as
gendered violence. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST
LAWMAKING 5 (2000) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN] (describing the relationship
between heterosexual intimate partner violence and gender inequality); see also Weissman, supra
note 71 (discussing the economic aspect of hegemonic male gender roles as a potential cause of
domestic violence).
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through the systematic comparison of multiple dimensions of privilege and
subordination, existing approaches to intersectional analysis that limit
categorical complexity also tend to inhibit making connections within and
between categories. Thus, integrating the benefits of intra-and
intercategorical approaches requires rethinking the ways in which categories
are organized in relation to one another within the analytical structure of
intersectionality. The framework of “particularity” and “generality” is
helpful for interpreting the significance of these issues for domestic violence
theory and practice.
B. Complexity, Particularity, and Generality
Feminist theorist Elizabeth Schneider coined the terms “particularity”
and “generality” to describe the relationship between women’s
individualized experiences of domestic violence, including those analyzed
by intersectionality (particularity), and larger social problems of violence
and subordination (generality).174 According to Schneider, particularity
requires “describing the complexity of women’s experiences nonsimplistically, accurately, and in greater detail.” At the same time, Schneider
argues, those experiences must be connected to “the more ‘general’
dimensions of the problem.”175 Schneider identifies two components of the
general: “first, the way in which [women’s experience of domestic violence]
must be viewed as linked to larger problems of societal violence; and,
second, as linked to women’s subordination in general.”176
The relationship between particularity and generality is dialectical as
well as interdependent in nature.177 The inclusiveness of the particular
informs the rigor and utility of an analysis of the general problem; the
identification of the general problem helps determine the way particular
experiences are identified as relevant and the way they are understood. For
example, understandings of domestic violence based on universalized
narratives drawn from the experiences of white, middle-class, heterosexual
women have limited the explanatory power of theories about why domestic
violence happens, and to whom.178 Paradoxically, stereotypes attributing the

174.
See generally Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54 (introducing the
concepts of particularity and generality). See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173,
at 59–73 (discussing generality and particularity).
175.

Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54, at 527.

176.

Id.

177.
See id. at 528 (relating the dialectic between generality and particularity to a similar
dialectic between theory and practice).
178.
See supra Part II (discussing the origins of the perfect victim trope in domestic violence
legal discourse). See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 62–71 (discussing the
need for an expansion of feminist conceptions of battering).
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problem of domestic violence to the working and lower-classes also limit
understanding of the problem.179 As explained, intersectionality challenges
the first approach and complicates the second with more particularized
descriptions of domestic violence based on the experiences of individuals
subject to multiple forms of subordination.180 However, as Schneider
explains, the construction of a battered woman identity is in itself
“particular,”181 and focusing solely on particularity is problematic for
reasons other than inclusivity:
While the development of a distinct legal construct concerning
male battering of women has been theoretically important and
strategically necessary, moving to the more general level of
violence between intimates and women’s subordination can
illuminate theoretical and strategic issues that advance our work.
Paradoxically, this very emphasis on particularity, on the
distinctiveness of battered women’s experiences, has had an
unintended effect of compounding the problems of battered women
because we have insufficiently connected battered women’s
experiences to both the larger and more general problems of
women and to those of violence between intimates.182
According to Schneider, problems for battered women created by an overreliance on a particularized battered woman identity include a persistent
focus by media and policymakers “on the individual woman and her
‘pathology’ instead of on the batterer and the social structures that support
the oppression of women and that glorify or otherwise condone violence.”183
Therefore, Schneider argues that feminists should strengthen domestic
violence theory and practice by being simultaneously more particular in
elucidating the diversity of individual experiences of domestic violence and

179.
See PTACEK, supra note 53, at 20–21 (noting that feminists promoted universalized
narratives partly in response to these stereotypes). See also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, When Reading
Between the Lines Is Not Enough: Lessons from Media Coverage of a Domestic Violence HomicideSuicide, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 269, 285 (2009) [hereinafter MacDowell, Reading
Between the Lines] (noting that both approaches reinforce hegemonic narratives about domestic
violence).
180.
See supra Part II (discussing the contribution of intersectionality theory to understandings
of women’s experiences of domestic violence).
181.
See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 60–62 (detailing problems
associated with the battered woman identity, including its reductive, totalizing nature (reducing the
entirety of a victim’s identity to the experience of battering), its rhetorical effect of locating the
problem in the victim (as opposed to suggesting she has been subjected to an external harm), and its
association with negative stereotypes of helplessness rather than resistance).
182.

Id. at 72.

183.
Id. at 72. But see MacDowell, Reading Between the Lines, supra note 179, at 273–76
(detailing how routine production of news, rather than failed feminist accounts, results in hegemonic
representations of domestic violence crimes).
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more concerted in their effort to connect those experiences to more general
issues of subordination.184
As detailed above, however, the intracategorical approach traditionally
used by intersectional theorists limits the analysis of particularity (and thus
generality) in at least three interrelated ways. First, the analysis of
particularity is limited because intracategorical approaches typically focus
on single dimensions of multiple categories (like the victim half of the
victim–perpetrator dichotomy) rather than multiple dimensions of each.185
Second, the analysis of particularity is limited because the focus of
intracategorical inquiry is typically on individuals subject to multiple
intersecting axes of subordination (like low-income women of color) rather
than persons subject to intersections of privilege and subordination (like
middle-class, heterosexual men of color).186 As a result, to the extent that
intracategorical analysis includes an analysis of privilege, it is typically a
byproduct rather than a focus of the inquiry and—lacking a comparative
dimension—is necessarily incomplete.187 Third, the intracategorical
approach limits the development of particularity because, to the extent that it
results in newly-analyzed categories of experience (like more detailed
accounts of the experiences of particular women of color or sexual
minorities, or as recommended herein, the experiences of perpetrators), it
lacks a methodological component for making connections between new
categories, and between new and other, pre-existing categories. Simply
adding additional, more detailed accounts does not solve this problem, or—
absent meaningful connections at the level of particularity—result in a
coherent, generalized account. Thus, in addition to more detailed accounts, it
is necessary to add a systematic, comparative component to intersectional
analysis. To cast further light on this problem, it is useful to consider
particularity and generality in terms of a spatial analogy in which they have
vertical and horizontal aspects. These aspects are evident in feminist theory
184.

SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 59.

185.
See supra Part IV (comparing inter and intracategorical approaches to studying
intersectionality).
186.
See supra Part IV. See also Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity, supra note 8, at
856; Ehrenreich, supra note 131, at 272–73 (arguing the analyses of most intersectionality theorists
“imply that the intersectional effect is relevant only when two subordinated statuses are interacting
to affect the individual (or subgroup)”); Hutchinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 9, at 311–12
(observing, “intersectionality usually focuses primarily upon the reality of intersecting
subordination”).
187.
See Sylvia Walby et al., Intersectionality: Multiple Inequalities in Social Theory, 46 SOC.
224, 227 (2012) (arguing that by focusing on agency within disadvantaged groups intersectionality
loses sight of power and racist structures). One might object that this is not a problem of
intracategorical analysis per se, but simply a shortcoming of the literature. In other words,
intracategorical research could examine intersections of privilege and subordination, but generally
does not. Thus, it is unclear how it limits the development of particularity. However, while
intracategorical method might be used to explore relative privilege, it does not facilitate the type of
comparative inquiry from which these intersections are revealed.
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and in the dominant domestic violence discourse that feminist theory is
responsible in part for shaping.
In their vertical aspect, particularity and generality can be viewed as a
layered hierarchy of connections between categories, concepts, and issues
that build from the most specific (or particular) at the base to the most
general at the top. For example, the highest level of the general in a given
line of reasoning about domestic violence might be family violence
(including children and elders as well as intimate partners), violence against
women, or some other more general category, under which are categories of
increasing specificity, such as intimate partner violence, battering of women
of color, and so on.188 In contrast, the horizontal aspects of particularity and
generality involve the development of categories that appear discrete in
relation to one another.189 This is illustrated by the categories of
heterosexual and LGBTQ relationship violence. In feminist theory, law, and
popular culture, domestic violence is generally synonymous with the abuse
of women by men.190 In turn, relationship violence involving same-sex or
transgender individuals is typically categorized (and as noted above,
analyzed) as distinct from heterosexual relationship violence, such that
mutually exclusive categories based on sexual orientation and/or gender
identity are created. Since they are generally considered distinct, these
categories can be viewed as silos, horizontally arranged in relation to one
another. Figure 1 illustrates the horizontal and vertical aspects of
particularity and generality within a vertically constructed analysis.

188.
In their vertical aspect, particularity and generality can also be conceptualized as the
relationship between micro and macro level analyses and processes. Patricia Hill Collins, for
example, distinguishes between intersectionality (which she defines as the analysis of particular
forms of intersecting oppressions) and the organization of interlocking oppressions. COLLINS, supra
note 44, at 18. Collins defines a matrix of domination as “the overall organization of hierarchical
power relations for any society.” Id. at 299 (defining matrix in the glossary). Generality would
include Collins’s matrix of domination, but also refers to less expansive constructs like violence
against women.
189.
Cf. Robert Westley, Reparations and Symbiosis: Reclaiming the Remedial Focus, 71
UMKC L. REV. 419, 423 (2002) (describing social group identities such as “woman” as multiplying
with increasing specificity along a vertical axis, and social groups as proliferating along a horizontal
axis as a result of the application of antiessentialist or intersectional theory). See also Ehrenreich,
supra note 131, at 270 (describing the former as a problem of “infinite regress”).
190.
See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction
of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 614–15 (1996)
(describing a “dominant domestic violence discourse” that equates domestic violence with
heterosexual relationships); SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 173, at 68 (“The
mainstream domestic violence movement has long operated from a heterosexist perspective.”).
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Figure 1

Absent a comparative method for linking categories, both the vertical
and horizontal aspects of generality and particularity present dangers to the
rigor and utility of domestic violence theory. The danger of the horizontal
aspect lies in the apparent lack of relationship between categories. In their
horizontal construction, categories multiply as islands of difference, with
little or no basis for communication across differences that might lead to
greater understanding, collective knowledge, or action.191 A danger of the
vertical aspect lies in relating more particular categories, such as domestic
violence against black women or Latinas, to more general categories, such as
violence against women, without first relating them to each other. When
moving from particularity to generality in this fashion, individuals or groups
analyzed with particularity tend to remain mere examples of ways in which

191.
There is also a problem of collective action in the theoretical collapsing of vertical
categories, but (as explained below) as a result of exclusion rather than a lack of shared
understanding. Cf. Westley, supra note 189, at 423 (describing both the vertical and horizontal
aspects of identity theory as having tendencies that threaten collective action).
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subordination happens, rather than usable data from which general
principles regarding the operation of power structures like racism and
heteropatriarchy can be extracted. For the same reason, the vertical aspect of
particularity and generality also tends to perpetuate dominant narratives
about domestic violence. This is one way to understand the tendency in
feminist theory to conflate intimate partner violence against women and
heterosexual battering: the particularity of categories that do not fit within
the dominant narrative (like violence in lesbian relationships) has been left
out of the more general analysis.192 This does not mean that groups outside
the dominant narrative like lesbians, are never analyzed with particularity; as
discussed above, lesbians have been the subject of careful intracategorical
inquiry. However, absent a comparative methodology, the significance of
their particular experiences tends to remain unincorporated into general
accounts of domestic violence.193
In this way, both the horizontal and vertical aspects of generality and
particularity can result in the breakdown of domestic violence theory and
praxis due to the failure of particularity. Returning to the prior examples,
both the subsuming of particular experiences within dominant narratives (by
which domestic violence is equated with violence within heterosexual
relationships) and the isolation of horizontal categories (by which
heterosexual and LGBTQ relationship violence are siloed) tend to omit
lesbian women who are battered and not in heterosexual relationships from
the dominant discourse about domestic violence. Intracategorical method
cannot solve this problem because it lacks a comparative or other
methodological element for linking categories. Moreover, the intersectional
identities and experiences of perpetrators, including heterosexual men of
color (like Steve and Jerome), are subject to even greater erasure from both
the dominant discourse and critical theory about domestic violence because
they are not typically identified as significant to the analysis of gender
violence as individuals, and therefore are not analyzed with any
particularity.194 In each instance, the feminist analysis of gender and gender

192.
See Goldfarb, supra note 190, at 603–04 (discussing the exclusion of gays and lesbians
from feminist accounts of domestic violence that also fail to circumscribe the subject of their
inquiry).
193.
It is also the case that LGBTQ relationship violence tends to be under-analyzed, perhaps
in part because it appears more particular than it really is in comparison to heterosexual relationship
violence.
194.

As described by Dowd:
[M]en have been largely absent from feminist theory as an object of gender analysis,
and thus they have tended to be viewed in an essentialist, universal, undifferentiated
way. Men have been viewed as a class or group, as a basis for comparison . . . ; as the
source of subordination by virtue of gender privilege or abusive power . . . ; as
beneficiaries of gender privilege by virtue of norms that presume men as the subject . .
. . While this placement of men in feminist analysis is not unjustified, it reflects an
acceptance of men, in most instances, as undifferentiated and as largely privileged by
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violence is necessarily rendered incomplete. Thus, while more particularity
is clearly needed, so is an analysis that facilitates comparisons across
categories. While Schneider does not provide a method for doing so, or for
linking particularity and generality,195 insights gleaned from the
intercategorical approach suggest that mapping the connections between
particular intersectional experiences (like heterosexual and LGBTQ
relationship violence, as well as victims and perpetrators) will be more
successful than linking the particular to the general in the more
individualized and unidimentional process typical of intracategorical
approaches.
C. Theorizing from Particularity
Crenshaw referred to the project of centering and illuminating the
intersectional nature of subordination as “mapping the margins” of dominant
discourse about race and gender.196 A more intercategorical approach to
intersectionality involves revisiting the margins between social categories in
order to map out the more complete, nuanced, and relational inquiry
entailed. This remapping is facilitated by three significant shifts in the
analytical structure of intersectional theory about domestic violence.
First, expanding the intersectional frame is best achieved by shifting
from the vertical to the horizontal aspect of particularity and generality.
Because more particularity is needed for an intercategorical analysis of the
performed intersectional experiences of all parties to a domestic violence
case, the importance of a horizontal analysis—one that can also grasp the
relative nature of privilege and subordination—is increased. Building
generality from particularity horizontally, by identifying linkages between
and within categories of difference (like victims and perpetrators and the
many subcategories that comprise them), rather than vertically by linking
more particular categories to more general categories, concepts, or issues,
will help theorists avoid inadvertently circumscribing the analysis. As
discussed above, generality should be the sum of relevant parts. A horizontal
analysis, while not entirely eradicating the danger of siloed categories, will
be more likely to result in a robust generality by moving through, and
remaining grounded within, particularity.
Second, an expanded intersectional frame is facilitated by a shift away
from the intersections of subordinating categories to the relationships
between the co-occurring intersectional identities of both the victim and the
perpetrator. The cases of Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve show
the gender system.
DOWD, supra note 77, at 13–14.
195.

See supra note 174.

196.

See Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 44, at 1241.
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that each individual party to a domestic violence case is subject to not only
one preexisting intersectional identity, but also to the stereotypes and norms
applicable to their role in the case. These co-identities demonstrate another
dimension of particularity and generality: each intersectional identity exists
in relation not only to the general master categories giving rise to the
intersectional metaphor (e.g., race, gender, sexuality, class, etc.), but the
categories particular to the given circumstances (e.g., those pertaining to the
perfect victim and the perceivable perpetrator), and their performance of
those categories. Thus, Sandra and Madeline performed their identities in
family court with reference to the intersections of race, gender, sexuality,
and class pertaining to both the perfect victim and to them as individual
women of color. Similarly, Jerome and Steve performed their identities in
relation to the categories and expectations pertaining to perpetrators as well
as those applicable to them as men of color more generally. In turn, each
party’s relative success in the case depends on their performance (or, in the
case of perpetrators, avoidance) of co-identity as well as the performance of
the other party, significant witnesses, attorneys, and others. Figure 2
illustrates the relational nature of co-identity between plaintiff and defendant
in a domestic violence case in family court.
Figure 2

Third, this complexity of analysis requires a shift from the intersections
of identity categories to the interstices created by the intersecting ideals,
stereotypes, and norms constituting specific identities—in other words, to
the relative positions of the identities of different subjects with respect to
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those ideals, stereotypes, and norms. While a precise depiction of these
relationships is probably impossible, Figure 3 offers a schematic rendering
of the co-occurring and interdependent identities at issue in Sandra and
Jerome’s and Madeline and Steve’s family court cases.
Figure 3

In Figure 3, each line within the two hexagons represents the ideal of a
particular dimension of identity; distance from any particular line indicates
the degree of removal from the ideal. Thus, the perfect victim is placed at
the intersection of the identity structures that constitute her identity: she is
white, middle-class, and heteronormative in her femininity. Sandra is close
to middle-class and therefore situated fairly close to that line; phenotypically
black and so distant from the white line; and does not present herself as a
passive, docile woman, so also distant from the line indicating
heteronormative femininity. In contrast, while Madeline has the same class
position as Sandra, her performance of Latina identity arguably renders her
somewhat closer to white, and also closer to heteronormative femininity. As
for the men in these cases, Jerome closely matches the characteristics of the
perceivable perpetrator, while Steve differs from the stereotype in some
respects. The intersectional metaphor does not, by itself, capture these more
relational qualities. However, intersectional theory does the work. By
attending to the interstices of intersectionality rather than focusing on the
intersection alone, we can better account for intercategorical and relational
complexity.
These shifts fit within trends in critical legal theory toward studying the
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interconnectedness of forms of subordination—not only in relationships
between structural identity categories, like those considered in intersectional
analysis, but in connections between different manifestations of structural
subordination, like violence by men against other men, state violence, and
violence against women and within communities.197 For example,
consideration of these connections informs a recent proposal by Angela
Harris to consider moving from a constituency or issue-based approach to
analyzing and addressing violence (e.g., violence against women or violence
against LGBTQ communities) to a broader gendered-violence approach.198
In keeping with the discussion above about the interrelationship of
particularity and generality, Harris’s recommendation relies on a detailed
understanding of various levels of particularity—e.g., men and the
production of hegemonic masculinity, the victimization of women in
heterosexual relationships, and the experiences of violence within LGBTQ
communities.199 Moreover, her analysis relies on the relationships between
these particular contexts and categories, which would be obscured by the
circumscribing or siloing of categories that occurs absent a comparative,
analytically horizontal approach.
In addition to the foregoing, the analysis of the victim–perpetrator
dichotomy operating in Sandra and Jerome and Madeline and Steve’s cases
provides several other indications for what theorizing from particularity
might look like. First, the analysis utilizes the insights of prior
intracategorical work on intersectional identity from inside and outside the
domestic violence literature. Thus, theorizing generality from particularity
can proceed from either original research and analysis of a problem, or from
the assemblage of the results of prior intra-or intercategorical efforts.
Moreover, connections can and should be sought from across the spectrum
of critical literatures.200
197.
See Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison
Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 35–36 (2011) (describing recent developments in critical
legal scholarship). See also DOWD, supra note 77, at 23 (noting the pressing challenge to connect
fields of theory studying dominance, like feminism and masculinity theory).
198.
Harris, supra note 197, at 36 (“[Concluding] anti-violence theorizing and advocacy must
take an integrated approach, understanding the interplay of race, sexuality, class, and gender and
taking account of the places where, and the means by which, gender violence is perpetuated.”). Cf.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 54, at 567 (“Although the development of a
distinct legal construct concerning male battering of women has been theoretically important, and
strategically necessary, moving to the more general level of violence between intimates and
women’s subordination can illuminate theoretical and strategic issues that advance our work.”).
199.
See Harris, supra note 197, at 35–36 (drawing connections between violence against men
in prison and the production of destructive masculinity, and violence against women and queer
communities).
200.
See Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and
Ethnicity in the Law, Theory, and Politics of “Sexual Orientation,” 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1296–
97, 1330 (noting the importance of cross-jurisprudential and interdisciplinary approaches to tracing
the interconnectivity of forms of subordination).
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Second, while examining every dimension of master categories may be
unnecessary (and prohibitive), examining all dimensions of the primary
category at issue is usually essential to achieving an analysis that is
sufficiently particular. Therefore, correctly identifying the dimensions most
directly implicated by a given context for analysis is important. This also
means care must still be taken in most cases to minimize the problem of
inadvertently eliminating or circumscribing categories of difference. This
can be done by making explicit the boundaries of the topic, the categories
being considered, and the issues and categories that remain unaddressed.201
In addition, the intracategorical approach may remain best suited for its
original purpose—analyzing previously unexplored intersectional locations.
Even in those cases, however, effort can be made to connect the significance
of a newly analyzed category to other preexisting categories.
A more particularized approach also has implications for practice.
Based on her examination of the close connections between incarceration
and other forms of violence, for example, Harris proposes looking outside
the criminal justice system for solutions to gender violence.202 The case
studies introduced in this Article show that the civil system may also be a
site for the reproduction of racist and heteropatriarchal hierarchies in ways
not previously understood. This underscores the need to rethink the function
of the civil justice system in facilitating autonomy and safety for victims.203
These problems cannot be addressed by thinking about victims alone and
may in fact be intractable. Thus, the need for alternative approaches to
gender violence is indicated by outcomes in the civil as well as the criminal
justice system.
Nonetheless, the need for more study is also indicated. Little is known
about the role of identity in the civil justice system because demographic
data about litigants in family law cases is not routinely tracked. Finding
ways to collect data about litigants and outcomes in civil domestic violence
cases while protecting the privacy of parties would facilitate quantitative,
intercategorical research on outcomes and make it easier to learn more about
the dimensions of the problem. In addition, qualitative approaches will
remain important in order to capture the role of identity performance in case
outcomes. To this end, “court watch” programs that train volunteers to
observe court proceedings in order to evaluate the treatment of victims by
judges and other court personnel should incorporate criteria for evaluating
the performed identities of victims and perpetrators into their trainings. This
201.
See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note 190, at 619 (“If the [domestic violence] literature described
and theorized intimate violence in heterosexual relationships while explicitly stating its focus, far
less damage would be done to the visibility and credibility of victims of same-sex intimate
violence.”).
202.

Harris, supra note 197, at 38–39.

203.
See MacDowell, When Courts Collide, supra note 32, at 118–22 (critiquing the
characterization of civil courts as providing autonomy for victims).
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type of data will be invaluable for determining what sorts of system reforms
are needed to make courts more responsive to victims and to evaluate
proposed alternatives.
V. CONCLUSION
A lawyer for a non-stereotypical victim like Sandra may assume that
her client was successful because she was heard, believed, and taken
seriously: the judge got it. Conventional intersectional analysis supports this
interpretation. Considered together, however, Sandra and Madeline’s cases
suggest that outcomes turn not only on decision-makers’ perceptions of
victims, but also—or even primarily—on whether there is a perceivable
perpetrator. Therefore, analysis of the victim in relation to the perfect victim
trope is not sufficient to interpret outcomes or a reliable predictor of what
will happen in future cases. Only examining the performed intersectionality
of all the relevant parties to each case explains the structural dimensions of
what may at first appear to be incongruously different results.
The relationship of the perfect victim and the perceivable perpetrator
demonstrates the importance of addressing manifestations of structural
subordination with the interrelationship of subordinating categories, as well
as relative privilege. As a method, intersectionality is especially well-suited
to explore the relationship between the multi-dimensional aspects of power.
Both intra-and intercategorical approaches to intersectional analysis locate
individuals within a web of social structures that together form the more
general manifestations of subordination. Adding perpetrators and the
concept of performed intersectionality to the intersectional frame is an
additional step toward a more comprehensive analysis of domestic violence
that maintains categories as analytical constructs, but also facilitates
identifying the connections between them in order to further a more broadly
defined anti-subordination agenda.

